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A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING IMPLICIT 
BIAS 
Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen* 
Actors’ implicit biases impact the law in areas ranging from 
employment discrimination to criminal law.  Legal scholars are 
rightly concerned with the effects of implicit bias and have suggested 
a myriad of ways to counteract it.  Many employment discrimination 
scholars, however, are pessimistic about the current law’s potential to 
curtail the effect of implicit bias.  Very little has been written about 
how the actual framework of an employment discrimination suit can 
mitigate bias.  This Article fills that gap by suggesting a framework 
and exploring the importance of the framework at the summary 
judgment stage of litigation.  This Article examines the way in which 
the framework courts use in individual disparate treatment 
employment discrimination cases can work indirectly to force 
employers to reflect upon their motives for a particular decision.  It 
advocates using the motivating factor framework at the summary 
judgment phase, which will ultimately change employers’ decision-
making behavior.  Through a review of social psychology literature on 
decision-making and implicit bias, as well as a comparative case 
analysis of the differing frameworks used to analyze individual 
disparate treatment cases, it demonstrates the power that the 
motivating factor framework holds to indirectly mitigate the effects of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in social psychological research have determined 
that people act upon implicit biases of which they are not aware.  When 
employers act on these biases, employees suffer.  However, if the biases 
are implicit, how can the law address them?  Scholars have suggested a 
myriad of ways to counteract such biases in the employment 
discrimination context.  Unfortunately, there has been little written about 
how the actual framework of an individual disparate treatment case can 
work in an indirect way to force self-reflection and, thus, recognition of 
such biases.  This Article attempts to fill that void by suggesting a 
framework for evaluating such claims that forces employers to reflect 
upon their motives for a particular decision and, hopefully, change 
employer’s behavior. 
As an example consider, Todd White, an African-American male, 
who in January 2001 was enjoying success as a valued employee of 
Baxter Healthcare Corporation.1  He was employed by the company and 
its predecessor, Ohmeda Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., for several years 
as a sales representative selling proprietary and generic pharmaceutical 
products and was recently promoted to the position of Teaching Center 
Specialist.2  The previous year White was awarded membership in the 
company’s Distinguished Sales Club, an honor reserved for the top 5% 
of Baxter’s sales representatives.3  Until January 2004, Richard Clark 
 1. The introductory narrative is based on White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th 
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 385. 
 3. Id. 
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was White’s supervisor and White’s performance reviews were quite 
strong.4  For example, in his 2003 performance review, Clark raved, “I 
could not be happier with your results YTD . . . I know that you will 
finish the year at #1!”5 
Just two months after this review, White was required to report to a 
different supervisor, Tim Phillips.6  White soon began to notice signs 
that Phillips perhaps harbored discriminatory animus towards African-
American employees.7  For instance, Phillips would occasionally answer 
White’s phone calls by saying, “White, Todd” instead of just calling him 
by his first name as was customary.8  Additionally, Phillips commented 
on several occasions that “nobody wants to be around a black man” and 
referred to a female African-American employee as “that black girl,” 
rather than referring to her by her name.9 
Despite these subtle (or perhaps not so subtle) signs of prejudice, 
Phillips encouraged White to apply for the position of Midwest Regional 
manager within his division at Baxter.10  White applied but did not 
receive the promotion.  According to the panel of decision-makers, 
which did not include Phillips, White appeared “extremely aggressive” 
and “confrontational” in the interview.11  The panel gave the job to a 
woman with fewer credentials than White including less managerial 
experience and no MBA.12 
In addition to not receiving the promotion, White’s 2004 performance 
evaluation, authored by Phillips, was considerably less favorable than 
the one he had received from his previous supervisor only a year 
earlier.13  According to Phillips, White’s quantitative sales results were 
very poor and actually merited a lower rating than he gave White, but 
Phillips increased his performance score due to White’s dedication and 
commitment to the business.  Even with this enhanced score, White did 
not receive as large of a pay increase as he believed he deserved.14 
White’s situation is not uncommon.  How often are personal 
characteristics, specifically those that are irrelevant, used by another to 
make judgments?  Research on cognitive development is replete with 
 4. Id. at 385–86. 
 5. Id. at 386 n.2. 
 6. Id. at 385. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 386. 
 11. Id. at 387. 
 12. Id. at 386. 
 13. Id.at 387–88. 
 14. Id. at 388–89. 
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evidence that humans learn to categorize at an early age and part of this 
categorization process can lead us to rely on stereotypes in decision-
making as a heuristic device.15  The question, then, is not whether this 
process occurs, but rather what society can do about it.  Specifically, 
what should antidiscrimination laws do to counter the use of stereotypes 
in decision-making processes?  The question is complicated by the 
introduction of additional research showing that many of these 
stereotypes are automatic and are not consciously activated by a 
decision-maker.  Rather, they operate on an unconscious level such that 
an individual confronted with a choice between two job seekers, for 
example, may prefer the Caucasian applicant to the African-American 
applicant for reasons wholly unrelated to merit but not understand what 
these reasons are.16  Much has been written about what role the law 
should play in ferreting out and eliminating implicit bias.17  This was, in 
part, the issue confronted by the Sixth Circuit in the White case. 
After his poor performance review, White filed a complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and eventually filed suit 
alleging discrimination on the basis of gender and race in the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.18  All of his claims were 
dismissed on summary judgment, and on appeal, White contested the 
dismissal of his race discrimination claims in relation to Baxter’s failure 
to promote him and his poor performance evaluation.19 
One issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
 15. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (discussing the rapid and 
automatic categorizations underlying stereotypes); Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental 
Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 126–27 (1994) (“People immediately place the things they encounter into 
preexisting knowledge structures of schemata. . . . Although there is some controversy over the exact 
nature of the categorization process, there is widespread agreement that humans are prone to quick 
categorization of their environment.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1161, 1187–88 (1995) (discussing the notion that people categorize information as they receive it as part 
of the central premise of social cognition theory). 
 16. See infra notes 30 and 250 (and accompanying text) describing this research. 
 17. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 
980–81 (2006) (arguing that affirmative action can decrease implicit bias simply by increasing the level 
of diversity in the workplace); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1053, 
1058 (2006) (criticizing courts’ use of the honest belief rule and same actor rule because the 
psychological theories underpinning these rules are not aligned with how people actually behave.  The 
author argues that these rules reflect a view of discrimination as purposeful and deliberate, while social 
science research has shown that many stereotypes operate at an unconscious level.). 
 18. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
2380 (2009). 
 19. Id. 
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Circuit was how to assess White’s claim that his race, while perhaps not 
entirely responsible for Phillip’s poor evaluation, at least played a part in 
the evaluation.  The court noted that this issue was one that confronted 
federal courts around the country since 2003 when the Supreme Court 
decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.20  In that decision, the Supreme 
Court ruled that direct evidence was not required to establish a “mixed 
motive” claim under Title VII.21  Rather, relying on circumstantial 
evidence alone, a plaintiff could allege that race or some other 
prohibited category played a role in the employment decision.22  The 
Sixth Circuit correctly noted that the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits 
rejected the application of Desert Palace and the motivating factor 
framework at the summary judgment phase and, instead, retained the 
standard test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.23  This 
test requires the plaintiff to proffer evidence that could be used to infer 
that discrimination was the sole reason, not one of the reasons, for the 
adverse employment decision. 
The Sixth Circuit in White declined to take that approach,24 and 
joined the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits in permitting a mixed-motive 
plaintiff to avoid a defendant’s motion for summary judgment by 
producing evidence that a forbidden characteristic at least played a role 
in the decision.25  The court noted, “[t]his burden of producing some 
evidence in support of a mixed motive claim is not onerous and should 
preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record is devoid of 
evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff’s 
claim.”26  This decision is a step towards rooting out implicit bias 
because it allows a plaintiff to articulate a mixed motive case—and 
support it with rather minimal evidence—by demonstrating that a 
forbidden characteristic played a role in the decision at least at the 
 20. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 21. Id. at 92. 
 22. Id. at 99, 101–02. 
 23. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 24. White, 533 F.3d at 400 (“We do so by holding that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-
shifting framework does not apply to the summary judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive 
claims.”). 
 25. At the summary judgment stage, the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have stated that a 
plaintiff may prevail by either providing evidence that a defendant’s articulated legitimate reason is 
pretextual or by providing evidence that—in addition to legitimate reasons—defendant’s actions were 
also motivated by illegitimate (i.e., discriminatory) reasons.  See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident 
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005); see also, Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 
312–13 (5th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008). 
 26. White, 533 F.3d at 400. 
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summary judgment stage.  Law directly influences the decision-maker 
by recognizing that bad motives can sometimes be mixed with legitimate 
motives and that legitimate motives should not be permitted to simply 
mask the illegitimate motives as happens under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework.  However, the direct potential of the motivating factor 
framework is not the focus of this Article.  Courts are still reticent to 
attempt to get inside decision-maker’s heads to figure out the rationale 
behind their decisions.  Instead, courts, even under the motivating 
framework analysis, will often still look to some explicit evidence of 
bias either on the part of the decision-maker, other supervisors or the 
company in general. 
This Article argues that the law in circuits, which recognize the 
motivating factor framework at summary judgment, may actually have a 
greater, though more indirect, effect on the implicit biases of decision-
makers.  If as the Sixth Circuit articulated, the burden that must be 
satisfied by plaintiffs to make it past summary judgment is low then 
employers will become more concerned with the potential for suit when 
making employment decisions.  Specifically, employers, as encouraged 
by their counsel, will be forced to think about their real motives for 
making a decision.  Psychological research has shown that increased 
attention to decision-making reasons can have a positive effect on the 
recognition that automatic stereotypes may be playing a role in a 
particular decision.27  Therefore, forcing employers to pay more 
attention to the reasons behind their employment decisions, in order to 
avoid a law suit that may survive a summary judgment motion, is a 
promising step in rooting out implicit bias. 
This Article examines how the framework used by courts in 
individual, disparate treatment employment discrimination cases can 
work indirectly to force employers to reflect upon their motives for a 
particular decision.28  It advocates using the motivating factor 
 27. See, e.g., Wilson & Brekke, supra note 15, at 133 (“There is considerable evidence, then, that 
forewarning and debiasing manipulations are most likely to work when . . . [t]hey make people aware of 
the unwanted processing, they motivate people to resist it, and people are aware of the direction and 
magnitude of the bias and have sufficient control over their responses to correct for it.”); Irene V. Blair, 
The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 
247 (2002) (concluding that “highly motivated individuals can modify the automatic operation of 
stereotypes and prejudice”). 
 28. This Article focuses primarily on race and gender discrimination as prohibited by Title VII.  
The theory behind the paper’s hypothesis could work equally well in other contexts, including age 
discrimination.  However, the Supreme Court recently decided that the motivating factor analysis is not 
available for age discrimination claims brought pursuant to the ADEA because the ADEA, unlike Title 
VII, was not amended to reflect such a framework.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 
(2009).  Thus, although such an extension to age cases might be theoretically desirable, the Court has 
deemed it legally impossible, at least for the time being. 
6
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framework at the summary judgment phase; using this analysis will 
ultimately change employers’ behavior.  Although judges are hesitant to 
attempt to detect employers’ implicit biases, through the use of the 
motivating factor framework, judges can encourage an employer to self-
reflect when making employment decisions.  As discussed infra, being 
motivated to undertake such self-reflection can help detect implicit bias 
by the decision-maker himself.  The motivating factor framework will 
not empower judges to detect implicit bias in any given case; the 
framework will encourage decision-makers to reflect on all of their 
reasons for making an employment decision.  This self-reflection will 
lead to greater detection of implicit biases by the decision-maker herself. 
Part II discusses the issue of implicit discrimination and the insights 
cognitive psychology has had in this area.  It also examines some of the 
legal fields that scholars feel are particularly vulnerable to implicit bias 
and makes some suggestions for dealing with such bias in these areas.  
Part III considers implicit bias in the employment context, and why the 
case law under Title VII has historically proven inadequate to combat 
such bias.  It then relates other scholars’ proposals for combating 
implicit discrimination.  Next, Part III examines Desert Palace’s 
potential for combating implicit bias.  Part IV discusses why using the 
motivating factor framework at the summary judgment stage is so 
crucial in employment discrimination cases.  Part V analyzes how courts 
in two different circuits (the Eighth and the Ninth) are using the Desert 
Palace decision in completely different ways.  The matched case 
analysis supports the proposition that seems obvious and yet has gone 
untested: the differing standards at summary judgment lead to different 
outcomes in these circuits.  Part V argues that these differences will 
affect how well implicit bias is detected by the employment decision-
maker himself in these circuits.  Finally, Part VI sets forth an argument 
for why a more liberal interpretation of Desert Palace’s effect on the 
Title VII case law at summary judgment will lead to greater recognition 
of implicit biases by the employers themselves, which should lead to a 
decrease in the role that implicit bias plays in employment decisions.  In 
sum, this Article demonstrates that Title VII can combat implicit bias, 
though more indirectly than has been proposed by most scholars. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF IMPLICIT BIAS 
A. Implicit Bias in General 
In his seminal article, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection: 
7
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Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,29 Charles Lawrence argued: 
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about 
racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be 
characterized as neither intentional—in the sense that certain outcomes 
are self-consciously sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that the 
outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the 
decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and wishes. 
. . . . 
 . . . To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced us all, 
we are all racists.  At the same time, most of us are unaware of our 
racism.30 
Legal scholars often refer to such innate prejudice as “implicit 
bias.”31  They use this term to encapsulate the notion that everyone 
holds certain biases at an unconscious level, and these biases may 
influence our decision-making processes in ways of which we are 
completely unaware.32  The notion of implicit bias is rooted in 
psychological research about human cognitive processes.  Research in 
cognitive psychology shows that, from a very early age, humans are 
taught to categorize the world.  Categorization allows humans to make 
sense of the new information they encounter each day.33  For instance, 
children are taught the difference between colors, shapes, and sizes.  
This process continues as they grow, leading to more and more specific 
categories.  A two year old may know the difference between a car and a 
boat, but a five year old will likely know the difference between certain 
types of cars (e.g., station wagon, sedan, SUV, etc.).  This process of 
more sophisticated categorization continues with age.  The eight year 
old may recognize that his parents have a Ford, whereas the sixteen year 
old will know the difference between the Mustang and its less 
impressive relative 
This mental categorization process occurs in various aspects of 
 29. Charles L. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
 30. Id. at 322. 
 31. See, e.g., Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, Michelle Obama: A Contemporary 
Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination Through the Lens of Title VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
3, 20 (2009); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 364–373 (2007). 
 32. Krieger, supra note 15, at 1169, 1188, 1207, 1216–17. 
 33. Id. at 1189–91.  See also Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal 
Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental 
Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329, 338 (1992) (“When faced with data and the need to make 
judgments derived from that data, all humans may be categorized as ‘intuitive scientists.’  Information is 
processed through beliefs, theories, propositions, and schemas.  These knowledge structures enable us to 
label and categorize objects rapidly and, in most cases, correctly.”). 
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human life, including in grouping of individuals encountered on a daily 
basis.  According to psychologists, such categorization allows for more 
efficient processing of information, judgment-making,34 and can also be 
“socially useful [by] help[ing] people interact more easily.”35  This 
categorization process can result in stereotypes.  Despite the time-saving 
benefits of categorization, the process can become a problem when these 
categories turn into stereotypes of which an individual may not be 
aware.36  Although stereotyping is really just another form of 
categorization,37 once in place, these stereotypes may “contaminate” our 
intergroup decision-making with biases of which we are not aware.38  
Krieger has offered a useful and concise summary of social cognition 
theory’s explication of the process whereby stereotypes can contaminate 
our mental processes: 
[O]nce in place, stereotypes bias intergroup judgment and 
decisionmaking.  According to this view, stereotypes operate as “person 
prototypes” or “social schemas.”  As such, they function as implicit 
theories, biasing in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, 
encoding, retention, and recall of information about other people. 
 . . . Stereotypes, when they function as implicit prototypes or schemas, 
operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness.  Empirical 
evidence indicates that people’s access to their own cognitive processes is 
in fact poor.  Accordingly, cognitive bias may well be both unintentional 
and unconscious.39 
One way in which the manifestation of these automatic stereotypes 
has been tested is through the development of the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT).  This test, developed by Project Implicit, seeks to “examine 
thoughts and feelings that exist either outside of conscious awareness or 
outside of conscious control.”40  It does so by presenting subjects with a 
 34. See Blair, supra note 27, at 242; Fiske, supra note 15, at 367 (noting that studies have shown 
the “cognitive economy of stereotypes,” such that “stereotype labels—such as doctor, artist, skinhead, or 
real estate agent—saved resources in an impression formation task”). 
 35. Fiske, supra note 15, at 375. 
 36. Krieger, supra note 15, at 1187 (noting “that cognitive structures and processes involved in 
categorization and information processing can in and of themselves result in stereotyping and other 
forms of biased intergroup judgment previously attributed to motivational processes”).  See also Jody 
Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break The Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. 
L. REV. 733, 733–34 (1995) (defining stereotypes as “well-learned internal associations about social 
groups that are governed by automatic cognitive processes.”  The author contrasts this with prejudice, 
which he defines as “a set of conscious personal beliefs.”). 
 37. Krieger, supra note 15, at 1187. 
 38. Id. at 1188.  See also Wilson & Brekke, supra note 15, at 118–19 (recognizing mental bias as 
a type of “mental contamination” whereby “a person ends with an unwanted judgment, emotion or 
behavior because of mental processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable”). 
 39. Krieger, supra note 15, at 1188. 
 40. See Project Implicit, Background Information, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ 
9
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series of words and asking subjects to categorize certain words or 
pictures into groups.  For example, subjects participating in the race IAT 
are asked to associate pleasant words with European Americans and 
unpleasant words with African-Americans.  They are then asked to do 
the reverse.  An implicit bias against African-Americans is revealed 
when the subject is faster at associating African-Americans with 
unpleasant words and European Americans with pleasant words.  “The 
IAT is rooted in the very simple hypothesis that people will find it easier 
to associate pleasant words with white faces and names than African-
American faces and names—and that the same pattern will be found for 
other traditionally disadvantaged groups.”41  As Greenwald and Krieger 
have noted, over many different categories, “[t]he bias index’s values for 
IAT measures revealed considerably higher values than for the self-
report measures, indicating that implicit bias is far more pervasive than 
explicit bias.”42 
The operation of implicit biases has been tested in other ways.  
Researches often perform audit studies where an African-American and 
a Caucasian employee are sent into a job interview.  Though both have 
nearly the same qualifications for the job, the testers seek to determine 
whether one racial group of interviewees is consistently selected over 
another group.  The problem with these studies is the variability in the 
actual interaction between the employer and the candidates, which may 
account for some of the variation in results.  To eliminate this 
variability, Bertand and Mulainathan conducted a field study in which 
they sent resumes with identical qualifications to employers in the 
Chicago and Boston areas.  Some resumes had traditionally Caucasian-
sounding names, while others were for candidates with traditionally 
African-American names.  The authors found that the callback rate for 
the African-American resumes was significantly lower than the rate for 
Caucasian candidates, despite the nearly identical qualifications.43  
backgroundinformation.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010). 
 41. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 971. 
 42. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 945, 957 (2006).  There is currently a scholarly debate on the merits of the IAT.  See 
Gregory Mitchell & Philip Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1023 (2006); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 737 (2009) (questioning whether the delays reported on the IAT actually translate into 
“realistic settings”).  But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination 
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y. REV. 477, 480–81 (2007) (arguing that Mitchell and Tetlock’s real target is 
“the normative view of antidiscrimination law as reaching beyond acts reflecting the individual fault of 
the discriminator”). 
 43. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mulainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, (MIT Dept. of Econ., 
Working Paper No. W9873, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
10
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Although this field study indicates that signals sent by names played a 
role in employers’ interviewing decisions, there is a possibility that race 
and, specifically, implicit racial bias may not motivate the findings.  For 
instance, it is possible that socioeconomic status could be playing a role 
in the findings.  Nonetheless, laboratory studies indicate implicit bias’s 
importance as a causal factor in decision-making. 
In another study, subjects acted as a parole board and decided whether 
an individual was still a menace to society.  The subjects were presented 
with background information about the person and his or her crime.  
Researchers found that subjects were generally more punitive to an 
individual with a Hispanic name than an individual with a Caucasian 
name.44  The authors concluded that “[t]ransgressions that are consistent 
with a cultural stereotype of the transgressor appear to be attributed to 
stable dispositional factors rather than to transitory or unstable ones.”45 
B. Implicit Bias and the Law 
The effects of implicit bias on a decision-maker’s behavior concern 
legal scholars.  Authors have written about implicit bias in a range of 
areas from criminal law46 to communications law.47  Those studying the 
criminal justice system, the jury selection system, and employment 
law48 in particular are acutely concerned with the consequences of 
decision-makers’ implici
In criminal law, implicit bias is a great concern.  One area of study 
involves a police officer’s decision whether to shoot a potential criminal 
encountered on the street.  Studies have shown that “[p]olice officers not 
only viewed more Black faces than White faces as criminal, they viewed 
those Black faces rated as most stereotypically or prototypically 
_id=428367.  Additionally, a recent study bolsters the gap between individual’s explicit and implicit 
biases.  The study found that “racism may persevere in part because people who anticipate feeling upset 
and believe that they will take action may actually respond with indifference when faced with an act of 
racism.”  Kerry Kawakami et al., Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Responses to Racism, 323 SCI. 
276 (2009). 
 44. Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes on Decision Making and 
Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 267 (1985). 
 45. Id. at 279. 
 46. See R. Richard Banks et al., Race, Crime, and Antidiscrimination, in BEYOND COMMON 
SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008). 
 47. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2004). 
 48. See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman & Michelle Haynes, Subjectivity in the Appraisal Process: A 
Facilitator of Gender Bias in Work Settings, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN 
THE COURTROOM 127 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008); Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias in 3 NYU SELECTED ESSAYS ON LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 69 (Mitu Gulati & 
Michael Yelnosky eds., 2007). 
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Black . . . as the most criminal of all.”49  Additionally, the so-called 
“shooting studies” have found that “racial stereotypes create associations 
and expectations that may play a role in the sort of split-second 
decisions that may literally be a matter of life or death for police officers 
and suspects alike.”50  As Jerry Kang summarizes: 
 Charles Judd and his colleagues performed a . . . study in 2004 to 
identify what types of racial meanings generate the shooter bias — 
negative emotional affect (negatively valenced evaluations of Blacks), 
cognitive stereotype (linking Blacks to guns), or some combination 
(stereotyping associated with a particular evaluative valence).  
Participants were primed with a Black or White face.  The subsequent 
task involved categorizing a photograph as a handgun or insect.  While 
both categories are negatively valenced, only the first category is 
stereotypically associated with Blacks.  Researchers next asked 
participants to categorize objects as either sports equipment or fruits.  
Both categories are positively valenced, but only the first category is 
stereotypically associated with Blacks.  If (negative) prejudice were the 
sole source of the shooter bias, then we would expect to see no facilitation 
in categorizing sports equipment after a Black prime.  By contrast, if 
stereotypes were the sole cause, then we would expect to see facilitation 
with both guns and sports equipment and no facilitation with insects or 
fruits. 
 Consistent with [prior studies] the experimenters discovered that 
participants categorized guns faster when primed with a Black face.  They 
also found, however, faster categorization of sports equipment when 
primed with a Black face . . . Accordingly, the researchers concluded that 
stereotypes, rather than prejudice, best explain the shooter bias results.51 
Interestingly, an individual police officer’s association between 
Afrocentric features and harshness of treatment was not statistically 
related to such an individual’s explicit racial attitude.52  Automatic 
stereotypes, or unconscious bias, seem to play a role in an officer’s 
decision for treatment of a potentially armed suspect. 
Criminal law must confront the issue of how African-American and 
Caucasian defendants are treated in the courtroom.  Studies have shown 
that the race of the accused and the victim affect the treatment of the 
defendant.  However, the race of the victim really seems to determine 
the punishment.  That is, studies have shown that “killing a white person 
is more likely to result in a death sentence than killing a Black 
 
 49. See Banks et al., supra note 46, at 5. 
 50. Id. at 7. 
 51. Kang, supra note 47, at 1527–28. 
 52. Banks et al., supra note 46, at 8. 
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person.”53  This issue was the subject of McCleskey v. Kemp,54 where, 
the United States Supreme Court considered whether the imposition of 
the death penalty in Georgia was discriminatory.  The Court examined, 
among other evidence, the “Baldus” study.  This study included an 
analysis of more than four hundred variables in over one thousand 
Georgia homicide cases.  Ultimately, the authors concluded that only 
race could explain the difference in punishment imposed on defendants 
who killed Caucasian victims.55  Moreover, the authors concluded that, 
for at least a subset of cases, African-Americans who killed Caucasians 
were more likely to be sentenced to death than Caucasians who killed 
other Caucasia 56
As Jerry Kang summarizes, recent neurological studies have 
demonstrated that, when studied by functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI): 
[T]he amygdalas [that portion of the brain associated with the fear 
response] of White [study] participants ‘light up’ far more when they are 
subliminally shown Black faces as compared to White faces.  Moreover, 
the degree of amygdala activation is significantly correlated with 
participants’ IAT scores.  There is, however, no correlation with explicit 
measures of bias, which again demonstrates dissociation between explicit 
self-reports and implicit measures revealed by reaction-time 
differentials.57 
Such studies create concern about the likelihood that an African-
American suspect will be treated fairly by an arresting officer and that 
an African-American criminal defendant can be treated fairly by judges 
and jurors, at least by Caucasian judges and jurors, when brought to 
trial.  For, if Caucasian jurors, or at least most Caucasian jurors, are 
neurologically predisposed to fear African-American defendants more 
than Caucasian defendants, we can expect the presumption of guilt for 
an African-American defendant to be greater than that for a Caucasian 
defendant before the trial even begins. 
The implicit bias of individual jurors is not the only concern in the 
trial process.  Scholars have also expressed concern about the operation 
of attorneys’ unconscious bias during the jury selection process.  More 
specifically, the use of peremptory challenges has been targeted as a 
 53. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel Gross, Social Science and the Evolving Standards of Death 
Penalty Law, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 251 (Eugene 
Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008). 
 54. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 55. Id. at 356 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  See also Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 53, at 251. 
 56. Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 53, at 251. 
 57. Kang, supra note 47, at 1511. 
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likely product for the operation of implicit bias.58  As Antony Page 
stated, “At best, a peremptory challenge is an educated guess, whereas at 
worst it is merely the expression of naked prejudice.”59  While some of 
this prejudice may be explicit, much is likely to be unconscious and 
operate outside of the awareness of the striking attorney.60  Generally, 
when an attorney exercises a peremptory challenge, the attorney merely 
states his reason for striking the jury, and a judge must decide whether 
this seems plausible.  Much like the McDonnell Douglas framework 
used in employment cases, the Batson framework operates on the 
assumption that the striking attorney has only one reason for the strike 
and is aware of this reason.  As Antony Page notes, this is unrealistic in 
light of existing cognitive research on stereotypes.  Therefore, he 
suggests that since the peremptory challenge likely will not be 
eliminated in the near future, the best remedy for prevention of the 
operation of implicit bias during the use of a peremptory challenge is not 
a change in law, but rather in procedure used by judges.  Page 
elaborates: 
[T]here are more moderate steps that attorneys and judges should take to 
reduce the problem [of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges].  
These steps include judicial warnings about unconscious stereotyping 
before jury selection, enhancing voir dire through the use of race- and 
gender- blind questionnaires, and expanding the time allowed for voir 
dire.  Although much bias is automatic, unconscious and unintentional, 
unconscious bias can be reduced both by raising the visibility of our 
society’s egalitarian norms and by increasing the amount of information 
about potential jurors available to litigants.61 
These examples are just a sample of the legal areas that may be 
affected by implicit bias.  Obviously, the possibility that automatic 
stereotypes may affect an individual’s decisions without his knowledge 
has implications for many other areas of the law as well.  This Article 
focuses on the possible implications in the employment context—
particularly in race and gender intentional discrimination cases. 
For example, in one series of experiments: 
Michael Norton and his colleagues demonstrated [the effect of implicit 
bias] in simulated hiring and higher-education admissions decisions.  
They showed that subjects consistently altered the qualifications they 
deemed most relevant to the selection of a high-level construction 
 58. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005). 
 59. Id. at 158. 
 60. Id. at 159. 
 61. Id. at 161. 
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manager, a stereotypically male job.  When the male candidate had more 
education and less relevant job experience, subjects—who 
overwhelmingly preferred the male candidate—reported that they viewed 
education as more important than job experience.  When the male 
candidate had more job experience and less education than the female 
candidate, subjects ranked job experience as more important than 
education.  Either way, subjects tended to rank the criteria in a way that 
would justify selection of the male candidate on the grounds that he was 
‘better qualified’ than the female candidate they were rejecting.  
However, when subjects were forced to rank the selection criteria before 
seeing the candidates’ resumes, gender bias in selection largely 
disappeared.62 
To illustrate the extent of the problem in the employment context, 
recall the conclusion of the parole board study discussed in Part II.A 
supra, that “[t]ransgressions that are consistent with a cultural stereotype 
of the transgressor appear to be attributed to stable dispositional factors 
rather than to transitory or unstable ones.”63  This conclusion has 
important implications for the employment context.  If a manager must 
decide whether an employee should be fired due to a verbal altercation 
with a co-worker, for example, the manager may be influenced by his or 
her automatic stereotypes in making a decision—the manager will likely 
conclude that the employee whose race is perceived to be consisted with 
being “a trouble-maker” is consistent with that stereotype and should be 
fired.  On the other hand, the manager may find that a person who that 
manager does not stereotypically group as a trouble-maker was really 
just acting uncharacteristically in the instance and so should be given 
another chance.  Note that in this situation, nothing about the individual 
has been varied except his or her congruence with the manager’s 
stereotyped beliefs.  In the corporate world, where many managers are 
non-minorities, such practices could have devastating implications for 
minority employees. 
With the increased understanding of implicit bias and its prevalence 
came an increased concern on the part of discrimination scholars about 
the ability of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to counteract such 
unconsciously held stereotypes.  The next Part discusses some of the 
scholarship focusing on why Title VII, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court and various circuit courts, is unable to confront and curtail 
implicit bias.  The Part then discusses how Title VII could more 
effectively counteract such bias. 
 62. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at 1037 (citing Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social 
Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 821–22 (2004)). 
 63. Bodenhauser & Wyer, supra note 44, at 279. 
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III. TITLE VII AND IMPLICIT BIAS 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part 
that: 
it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail, or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.64 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court laid out a 
framework to be used when an individual plaintiff brings an 
employment discrimination case alleging intentional discrimination 
based on circumstantial evidence.  First, the plaintiff must make out a 
prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) the plaintiff belongs 
to a group protected under the statute; (2) the plaintiff applied for and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
(3) that, notwithstanding, his qualifications, he was rejected, and (4) 
after his rejection, the position remained open, and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff’s qualifications.65  
If the plaintiff does this, the burden of production then shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action.66  If the defendant meets this burden, the 
burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff and merges with the 
burden of persuasion, requiring plaintiff to prove that defendant’s 
articulated reason is pretextual.67  As noted by the Supreme Court, the 
burden on the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case and on the defendant 
to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is not onerous.68  
Thus, the majority of individual disparate treatment cases decided under 
the McDonnell Douglas framework are decided on the pretext prong.  In 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 65. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  Courts have modified this 
four-part prima facie case in circumstances not involving hiring decisions.  The more general 
formulation now used by many courts adapts the second and third prong to the nature of the adverse 
decision and replaces the fourth prong with the requirement that the adverse employment action 
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.  See, e.g., EEOC v. PVNF, 
L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007) (discriminatory failure to promote, demotion, and 
constructive discharge); Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1055 (8th Cir. 
2007) (discriminatory discipline and constructive discharge); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 
211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005) (discriminatory termination); Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 
645, 649–50 (4th Cir. 2002) (discriminatory training); Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, 292 
F.3d 654, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2002) (discriminatory termination). 
 66. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 67. Id. at 804. 
 68. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
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subsequent cases, the Court made clear that a plaintiff, simply by 
showing pretext, is not automatically entitled to a favorable judgment 
because plaintiffs must convince the factfinder not only that the 
employer’s proffered reason is pretext, but also that the real reason is 
discrimination.69 
The McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is a source of great 
contention among scholars concerned with targeting implicit bias under 
Title VII.70  Scholars have noted that the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
model is based upon an assumption that an employer only has one 
motive for making a hiring decision and that that motive is transparently 
clear to the employer at the time the decision is made.71  As discussed in 
 69. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) (“It is not enough, in other words, 
to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional 
discrimination.” (emphasis added)).  See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 
(2000) (emphasizing that the factfinder’s disbelief of defendant’s proffered reason does not 
automatically compel judgment for the plaintiff; but “’the factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put 
forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, 
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.’” (quoting 
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511)). 
 70. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem for a Heavyweight: Costa as Countermonument to 
McDonnell Douglas – A Countermemory Reply to Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965, 986 (2004) 
(“’That is, the problem is not simply that courts do not understand unconscious bias or that judges 
themselves are hopelessly unconsciously biased.  Rather, many judges quite consciously and 
deliberately believe that, even under Title VII, they should not interrogate the practices of the private 
workplace without direct evidence of mendacity.’” (quoting Chad Derum & Kren Engel, The Rise of the 
Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1177, 1192–93 (2003))); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious 
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 750 (2005) (noting that an alleged “discriminator’s awareness of 
her motivations is not a necessary element of a Title VII claim”); T.L. Nagy, The Fall of the False 
Dichotomy: The Effect of Desert Palace v. Costa on Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination 
Cases, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 137, 150 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An 
Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 107 (2003) 
[hereinafter Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort]; Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment Law (Really), 
59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 655 (2008); Krieger, supra note 15, at 1163–64; David Benjamin Oppenheimer, 
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 900 (1993); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional 
Discrimination: The Reality of the Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284 (1997) (arguing that 
despite the Supreme Court’s rhetoric concerning the importance of ferreting out unconscious or subtle 
discrimination, the Court, over the past twenty years, “has only seen discrimination, absent a facial 
classification, in the most overt or obvious situations—situations that could not be explained on any 
basis other than race”); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, 1057–58. 
 71. See Hart, supra note 70, at 746, 758 (“By focusing the legal inquiry on the employer’s intent 
at the moment an employment decision is made, the law fails to recognize that discrimination ‘can 
intrude much earlier, as cognitive process-based errors in perception and judgment subtly distort the 
ostensibly objective data set upon which a decision is ultimately based.’ . . . [C]ourts applying the 
McDonnell-Douglas framework mistakenly assume that employment decisions are motivated by a single 
factor—either honest business judgment or dishonest discriminatory motivation.” (quoting Krieger, 
supra note 15, at 1212)); see also Nagy, supra note 70, at 150 (“The dichotomy produced by the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is a false one.  In practice, few employment decisions are made solely 
on the basis of one rationale to the exclusion of all others.  Instead, most employment decisions are the 
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Part II, supra, however, many biases are held unconsciously and are 
perhaps not able to be easily detected by the employer at the time an 
employment decision is made.  Thus, if courts force plaintiffs to prove 
that discrimination is the sole reason for an adverse employment 
decision under McDonnell Douglas, they are interpreting Title VII too 
narrowly and in a way that is out of touch with the behavioral realities of 
the actors Title VII targets.  As Krieger and Fiske have argued, 
“resulting inconsistencies between the real world and the 
phenomenological models embedded in law can be highly 
problematic.”72  The need for congruence between the realities of how 
legal decision-makers act and the way in which the law assumes they act 
is a fundamental tenant behind the Behavioral Realist movement.73  
Krieger and Fiske further point out, 
 [i]n the context of antidiscrimination law, behavioral realism stands for 
the proposition that judicial models—of what discrimination is, what 
causes it to occur, how it can be prevented, and how its presence or 
absence can best be discerned in particular cases—should be periodically 
revisited and adjusted so as to remain continuous with progress in 
psychological science.74 
Given the apparent disconnect between the McDonnell Douglas sole 
factor theory of discrimination and the psychological developments 
highlighting the prevalence of implicit bias, it becomes apparent that 
intentional individual disparate treatment law must evolve in order to 
stay true to the realities of the employment decision-making process.  It 
result of the interaction of various factors, legitimate, and at times illegitimate, objective and subjective, 
rational and irrational.” (quoting Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 
2003))); Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort, supra note 70, at 108 (noting that by focusing on the conscious 
intent of employers at the moment the employment decision is made, “the McDonnell Douglas 
approach asks the wrong question” (emphasis added)); Katz, supra note 70, at 655 (discussing why it is 
problematic to put the burden, as the McDonnell Douglas framework does, on plaintiffs to prove but-for 
causation in individual disparate treatment cases); Krieger, supra note 15, at 1164 (discussing the 
inadequacy of current Title VII jurisprudence in addressing the “subtle, often unconscious forms of bias 
that Title VII was also intended to remedy”); Oppenheimer, supra note 70, at 900 (advocating for a 
negligence standard for employment discrimination cases, such that an employer could be held liable for 
discrimination “when the employer fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination that it 
knows or should know is occurring, or that it expects or should expect to occur . . . [or] when it fails to 
conform its conduct to the statutorily established standard of care by making employment decisions that 
have a discriminatory effect, without first carefully examining its processes, searching for less 
discriminatory alternatives, and examining its own motives for evidence of stereotyping”); Krieger & 
Fiske, supra note 17, at 1028 (“In numerous ways, antidiscrimination law reflects and reifies a common-
sense theory of social perception and judgment that attributes disparate treatment discrimination to the 
deliberate, conscious, and intentional actions of invidiously motivated actors.”). 
 72. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at 999. 
 73. Id. at 1000. 
 74. Id. at 1001. 
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is no longer sufficient to understand discrimination only as a product of 
an explicit bias that is well-recognized and understood by a decision-
maker at the time a decision is made.  Rather, the law must account for 
the fact that many employment decisions are based on reasons of which 
the employer may not have a conscious recognition. 
To its credit, the Supreme Court made a foray into this area by 
recognizing that not all decisions are based on one factor.  In Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,75 the Court stated: 
Moreover, since we know that the words “because of” do not mean 
“solely because of,” we also know that Title VII meant to condemn even 
those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate 
considerations.  When, therefore, an employer considers both gender and 
legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was 
“because of” sex and the other, legitimate considerations—even if we 
may say later, in the context of litigation, that the decision would have 
been the same if gender had not been taken into account.76 
Thus, the Court attempted to take a more realistic view of what an 
employer’s decision-making process entails.  The Court, however, 
limited Price Waterhouse’s so-called “mixed motive” framework to 
cases where an employee had direct evidence of discrimination.77  After 
Price Waterhouse, there were two paths for plaintiffs claiming 
individual disparate treatment to take.  First, those plaintiffs with direct 
evidence of discrimination could allege that the adverse employment 
decision taken against them was the result of mixed motives.  Such 
plaintiffs could then proceed under the Price Waterhouse framework 
and attempt to show that the illegitimate factor was a substantial factor 
in the employer’s decision-making process.78  Alternatively, plaintiffs 
with only circumstantial evidence can proceed under the traditional 
McDonnell Douglas framework. 
Price Waterhouse was soon modified by Congress through the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.  The Act amended Title VII to include Section 
703(m), which now reads: “Except as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the 
 75. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 76. Id. at 241. 
 77. This requirement actually comes from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the case.  See id. at 
261 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  This opinion was needed to form a majority and formed the basis of 
how many federal courts applied the new “mixed motive” framework after Price Waterhouse. 
 78. This language also comes from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.  Id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  Such a showing by a plaintiff was then subject to an affirmative defense by an employer: If 
the employer could show that it would have made the same decision regardless of the illegitimate factor, 
the employer would be relieved of all liability.  Id. at 276–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
19
Bucciarelli Pedersen: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  3:45:55 PM 
116 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”79 
This language has been the subject of much debate.  In 2003, the 
Supreme Court took another look at the “mixed motives” framework in 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.80  In Desert Palace, Costa, the only 
woman employed by defendant as a warehouse worker and heavy 
equipment operator in its hotel and casino, filed a claim for sex 
discrimination.81  Costa had numerous problems with management 
during the course of her employment and her record contained “an 
escalating series of disciplinary sanctions.”82  Desert Palace fired Costa 
after she was involved in a physical altercation with another worker.83  
That worker, Herbert Gerber, who had no disciplinary sanctions on his 
record, received only a five day suspension.84  Costa’s suit for sex 
discrimination went to trial and the district court instructed the jurors, in 
part, “If you find that the plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in the 
defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your 
verdict, even if you find that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by a 
lawful reason.”85  Desert Palace objected because respondent had failed 
to introduce direct evidence that sex was a motivating factor in her 
termination.86  The circuit court sided with Costa after rehearing the 
case en banc.87  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 abrogated the direct evidence requirement 
that most circuits had read into Price Waterhouse.  The Court held that 
direct evidence was not required in order to receive a mixed motive jury 
instruction under the Act since there is no such requirement within the 
statutory text.88 
At first glance, the case seemed to be a tremendous victory for 
employment discrimination plaintiffs.  As many scholars noted, the 
abrogation of the direct evidence standard would transform every 
individual disparate treatment case into a mixed motive case, and they 
believed that McDonnell Douglas was dead.89  If after Desert Palace the 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2010). 
 80. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 81. Id. at 95. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 95–96. 
 85. Id. at 96. 
 86. Id. at 97. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 97–98. 
 89. See, e.g., Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort, supra note 70, at 76 (“By a stroke of the judicial pen, 
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motivating factor standard applied in both direct and circumstantial 
evidence cases, what room could be left for McDonnell Douglas? 
However, this declaration was premature.  Footnote 1 in the Desert 
Palace decision stated, “This case does not require us to decide when, if 
ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context.”90  This 
footnote created some confusion among scholars and provided those 
courts, which were reluctant to apply the motivating factor analysis to all 
individual disparate treatment claims, with an excuse to avoid its 
application.91  Additionally, the fact that Desert Palace dealt with jury 
instructions allowed courts to reason that Desert Palace does not apply 
to summary judgment proceedings.92  Thus, the limited nature of the 
Desert Palace decision has caused debate among both scholars and 
courts as to what influence, if any, the decision actually had on the 
McDonnell Douglas framework. 
For one concerned with the possibility of unconscious discrimination, 
the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence is troubling.  If Desert Palace applies 
to all individual disparate treatment claims at summary judgment, 
plaintiffs would have to show that the employer’s decision was 
motivated by, but not solely attributable, to discrimination.  This appears 
to be a much easier standard and allow more cases to move past the 
summary judgment phase.  Such a development has enormous potential 
to remove society’s biases through the law.93  Part V explores the 
the unanimous Supreme Court in Costa has transformed every Title VII disparate treatment claim into a 
‘mixed motives’ claim.”); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title 
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2004) (noting that Desert Palace 
“essentially eliminates any relevant distinctions between various types of disparate treatment cases”); 
Michael Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell 
Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1888 (2004) (arguing that the Desert Palace decision will result in 
almost all individual disparate treatment cases being governed by Title VII Section 703(m)); Nagy, 
supra note 70, at 144–45. 
 90. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n.1.  Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended 
Title VII to add: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.”  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)). 
 91. See Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment 
Law: McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 512 (2008) 
(“McDonnell Douglas is as viable today as it has ever been and the limited nature of the Desert Palace 
opinion, among other things, has contributed to its continuing vitality.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
because Desert Palace v. Costa concerned the propriety of the motivating factor standard in jury 
instructions, the case had no effect on the court’s summary judgment jurisprudence). 
 93. Jolls and Sunstein have suggested different ways in which antidiscrimination law can have a 
debiasing effect on employers.  For example, Jolls and Sunstein have differentiated debiasing law from 
debiasing through law.  Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 
199 (2006).  The authors use the phrase debiasing law to refer to “strateg[ies] for insulation”—
attempting to protect legal outcomes from falling victim to bounded rationality.  Id. at 200.  They use the 
21
Bucciarelli Pedersen: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  3:45:55 PM 
118 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
differences between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.  These two circuits 
use Desert Palace at summary judgment in completely different ways.  
It examines cases with similar fact patterns that have come out 
differently in each circuit because of the standard each circuit employs 
at summary judgment.  Part VI explains why the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach could indirectly lead to a greater decrease in employers’ 
implicit biases than the Eighth Circuit’s approach.  First, however, this 
Article examines why the use of Desert Palace’s motivating factor 
framework at summary judgment is so crucial to uncovering implicit 
bias. 
IV. WHY APPLY THE MOTIVATING FACTOR FRAMEWORK AT THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE? 
Summary judgment is a critical phase in all litigation.  The literature 
on summary judgment is extensive and massive debate has ensued 
regarding the merits of summary judgment and whether summary 
judgment is being used appropriately, particularly after the Supreme 
Court’s 1986 trilogy.94  This Part summarizes some of the current 
concerns with the use of summary judgment and in particular, with its 
phrase debiasing through law, however, to refer to the situation where legal policy “operate[s] directly 
on the boundedly rational behavior and attempt[s] to help people either to reduce or to eliminate it.”  Id.  
In another paper, Jolls and Sunstein suggest that in order to reduce implicit bias, debiasing through law 
requires that the law act to “reduce people’s level of bias rather than to insulate outcomes from its 
effects.”  Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 977 (2006).  
The authors propose that existing antidiscrimination law not only acts to debias law by insulating 
potential discrimination victims from the outcomes of employer’s conscious discrimination, but also 
debiases through law by increasing population diversity in the workplace.  Id. at 980–81.  The authors 
argue that by increasing diversity in the workplace, the level of implicit bias is reduced as those holding 
such biases are introduced to and familiarized with individuals from the group against whom the bias 
was held.  Id. at 981–82.  The authors also suggest that current law prohibiting hostile work 
environments are likely also to have the effect of debiasing through law by operating on the “physical 
and sensory environment” of the workplace: 
  Under current antidiscrimination law, hostile environments featuring negative or 
demeaning depictions of protected groups (including, but not limited to, depictions in 
posters and other visual media) are generally unlawful in workplaces, educational 
institutions, and membership organizations.  In this way, current law governing sexual 
and racial harassment almost certainly produces some effect on the level of implicit bias 
in these institutions.  Compared to an environment in which such demeaning depictions 
were not unlawful, the current framework is likely to have a debiasing effect. 
Id. at 982–83. 
 94. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 
(2007); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting 
Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (2004); Arthur R. Miller, The 
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés 
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003). 
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use in discrimination cases.  It then discusses why, with those concerns 
in mind, the motivating factor is the right framework to use at this 
critical stage in employment discrimination litigation. 
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for 
summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery 
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”95  Scholars have noted the federal courts’ 
increased use of summary judgment since the Supreme Court’s 1986 
decisions in three cases involving summary judgment standards and 
procedures: 
In 1986, the now famous Supreme Court “trilogy”—[Celotex, Matsushita 
and Anderson]—transformed summary judgment from an infrequently 
granted procedural device to a powerful tool for the early resolution of 
litigation.  Since then, federal courts have employed summary 
judgment . . . in cases that before the trilogy would have proceeded to 
trial, or at least through discovery.96 
Motions for summary judgment are rarely granted in favor of 
plaintiffs, particularly in employment discrimination cases.  In fact, 
about 73% of summary judgment motions in employment discrimination 
cases are granted and almost all of these are in favor of defendants.97  
This is problematic for several reasons.  First, the granting of summary 
judgment denies litigants their day in court and the feeling that the 
judicial system has accorded them a fair result.  Additionally, the denial 
of summary judgment shapes the settlement process.  Thirdly, judges, 
rather than jurors, are more likely to be deferential to defendants seeking 
summary judgment, particularly in civil rights cases.  Finally, the review 
of evidence on summary judgment is necessarily different than at trial 
and may take on a contextually different meaning for the judge. 
When a plaintiff files a suit, he or she expects justice to be done.  
Termination of the suit in favor of the defendant before trial eliminates 
the opportunity to present all of the evidence, eliminates the right to go 
before a jury, and thwarts the plaintiff’s expectation of justice—all of 
which leaves the plaintiff with the feeling she has been deprived of her 
day in court.  As one scholar has noted, “the telling of the full story in a 
public setting can make an important difference to a plaintiff, even if she 
ultimately loses.”98  Leaving plaintiffs with the feeling they have 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 96. Miller, supra note 94, at 984. 
 97. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709 (2007). 
 98. Id. at 713. 
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somehow been treated unfairly or silenced inappropriately is a concern 
to the perceived legitimacy of our judicial system. 
In addition to effects on the legitimacy of the system, the grant of 
summary judgment also affects the litigation settlement process.  When 
summary judgment motions are filed by the defendants and denied, the 
balance of power shifts from plaintiff to defendant.  “For plaintiffs, 
summary judgment is the place of ‘do or die.’”99  “The threat of 
summary judgment shapes settlement even in advance of a motion being 
filed.  And when summary judgment is denied, lawyers and judges 
report that defendants immediately offer to settle, often with far more 
generous settlement offers than they might have otherwise 
considered.”100 
Thirdly, in civil rights cases and particularly in the employment 
discrimination context, summary judgment rulings are made by a judge, 
rather than trial by jury, which often results in a ruling bias in favor of 
defendants.  Scholars have noted the readiness of courts to defer to 
defendants’ stated reasons for an employment action, rather than credit a 
plaintiff’s accusations of discrimination.101  Courts are hesitant to 
second-guess employers’ business practices and tend to credit any 
seemingly legitimate reason articulated by employers for a given 
employment decision.102  This is problematic in the employment context 
where a multitude of reasons may account for an adverse employment 
action. 
Finally, when employment discrimination cases are decided by judges 
at the summary judgment stage, there is a tendency for judges to 
examine the evidence presented in a piecemeal fashion rather than in a 
holistic way.103  This is damaging to plaintiffs because evidence of 
 99. Id. at 715–16.  See also Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling 
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 45, 48 (2005). 
 100. Schneider, supra note 97, at 716. 
 101. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 889, 891 (2006) (noting that “[s]cholars have also documented well the judiciary’s failure 
to redress more subtle discrimination and the judiciary’s readiness to defer to the defendant’s stated 
reason for the challenged employment action”); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured 
Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 
231 (1993) (“Courts believe defendants when they articulate their non-discriminatory reasons for the 
employment decision and disbelieve plaintiffs when they attempt to prove that defendants’ articulated 
reasons are pretextual.”); Michael Selmi, Employment Discrimination and the Problem of Proof: A 
Symposium: Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 
(2001) (“[C]ourts are also affected by various biases that help explain their treatment of employment 
discrimination cases. . . . When it comes to race cases, which are generally the most difficult for a 
plaintiff to succeed on, courts often seem mired in a belief that the claims are generally unmeritorious, 
brought by whining plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along the way.”). 
 102. Parker, supra note 101, at 891, 927. 
 103. See McGinley, supra note 101, at 233; see also Schneider, supra note 97, at 729 (“In ruling 
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discrimination does not lend itself to isolated examination, but rather, 
discrimination often becomes apparent only in the context provided by a 
holistic examination of a defendant’s past acts and practices. 
There are benefits to courts’ increased use of summary judgment.  
Disposing of a case by means of summary judgment eases pressures on 
the judicial docket and can increase the efficiency of the litigation 
process.104  Additionally, summary judgment can be a legitimate means 
of saving the opposing party money in otherwise frivolous litigation.  
However, all of this assumes that the underlying litigation is not 
meritorious.  When summary judgment is used to control judicial 
caseloads, at the expense of otherwise legitimate cases, the device can 
be problematic.105  This is precisely the use demonstrated in many 
employment discrimination cases.  This issue is further complicated by 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.106  In that case, 
the Court heightened the pleading standard for discrimination plaintiffs, 
noting that: 
bare assertions [that] amount to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation 
of the elements” of a constitutional discrimination claim, namely, that 
petitioners adopted a policy “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group” . . . are conclusory and not 
entitled to be assumed true.107 
This case has left many wondering exactly what a discrimination 
plaintiff needs to prove in order to show the requisite intent.  Therefore, 
it is foreseeable that in the wake of Iqbal, courts will be more likely to 
use mechanisms, such as the motion to dismiss and the motion for 
summary judgment, to dispose of cases. 
Therefore, it becomes critical to identify ways that meritorious claims 
can be kept on the docket even after a summary judgment motion is 
filed.  Using the motivating factor framework at the summary judgment 
level may alleviate federal courts’ tendencies to simply defer to an 
employer once the employer has supplied some type of reason for its 
decision.  Additionally, this framework may allow judges the freedom to 
view various pieces of evidence as parts of a whole because the 
existence of various motivations would be allowed.  However, as 
on summary judgment motions, judges frequently slice and dice law and fact in a technical and 
mechanistic way without evaluating the broad context on an arid record, a record that is limited to 
discovery.”). 
 104. Bradley Scott Shannon, Should Summary Judgment Be Granted?, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 114 
(2008). 
 105. Id. 
 106. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 107. Id. at 1951 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 279 (1979)). 
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discussed more fully in Part VI.B, infra, the use of the motivating factor 
framework holds the potential for even more powerful indirect 
deterrence of employer discrimination by setting up an incentive system 
whereby the employer would be motivated to discover and attempt to 
mitigate any effect of implicit bias.  Summary judgment is a crucial 
phase in employment discrimination litigation and the importance of 
employing the correct test—one that recognizes the importance of the 
perceived legitimacy of our judicial system, the pivotal role of 
settlement power, and the tendency of judges to defer to defendants and 
examine evidence in isolation—is integral to ensuring correct results in 
these cases.  Just as crucial is employing a framework at summary 
judgment that has the potential to modify employers’ behavior, 
particularly behavior of which they may be unaware.  The motivating 
factor framework holds this potential.  But in reality, does it make a 
difference at the summary judgment stage? 
V. CURRENT CASE LAW 
As noted in Section III supra, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have 
taken vastly different approaches to how, if at all, Desert Palace affects 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit has held that Desert Palace did not affect the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis at the summary judgment phase.  In 
Griffith v. City of Des Moines,108 the court wrote: 
 Desert Palace involved the post-trial issue of when the trial court 
should give a “mixed motive” jury instruction under 1991 Title VII 
amendments codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).  
The Court’s opinion did not even cite McDonnell Douglas, much less 
discuss how those statutes impact our prior summary judgment decisions.  
While in general the standard for granting summary judgment “mirrors” 
the standard for judgment as a matter of law, the context of the two 
inquiries are significantly different.  At the summary judgment stage, the 
issue is whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence that unlawful 
discrimination was a motivating factor in the defendant’s adverse 
employment action.  If so, the presence of additional legitimate motives 
will not entitle the defendant to summary judgment.  Therefore, evidence 
of additional motives, and the question whether the presence of mixed 
motives defeats all or some part of plaintiff’s claim, are trial issues, not 
summary judgment issues.  Thus, Desert Palace, a decision in which the 
Supreme Court decided only a mixed motive jury instruction issue, is an 
inherently unreliable basis for district courts to begin ignoring this 
 108. 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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Circuit’s controlling summary judgment precedents.109 
While this explication of Desert Palace’s relation to McDonnell 
Douglas at the summary judgment phase does not seem to require a 
plaintiff to continue to show sole factor motivation at summary 
judgment, the Eighth Circuit’s further elaboration of its reasoning in 
Gilbert v. Des Moines Area Community College,110 does not provide as 
much hope for plaintiffs.  The Gilbert court stated: 
 As an initial matter, Gilbert attacks the district court’s method of 
analysis, arguing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, modified the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting analysis by clarifying Title VII only requires a 
showing that discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment 
decision.  Gilbert contends the district court employed a more restrictive 
standard at the summary judgment stage by analyzing Gilbert’s claim 
pursuant to McDonnell Douglas and erroneously required Gilbert to 
demonstrate race was the sole motivating factor in the challenged 
employment decision.  We disagree.  We previously have rejected the 
argument that Desert Palace modified our court’s use of the three-part 
McDonnell Douglas analysis at the summary judgment stage of an 
employment discrimination lawsuit.111 
While the court further noted that there was no evidence that the 
district court “improperly hinged Gilbert’s race discrimination claim on 
Gilbert’s ability to show race was the sole factor in [the] decision not to 
promote [him],”112 the holding seems to belie this notion.  In forcing 
Gilbert to fashion his case under the traditional McDonnell Douglas 
pretext model, the court forced Gilbert to demonstrate that 
discrimination was the real reason behind his denial of the promotion.  
For instance, although Gilbert demonstrated that he was more qualified 
than the candidate eventually selected for the job, the Eighth Circuit 
refused to rely on this finding for pretext, noting that courts defer to 
employers to make internal business decisions.  The court stated, 
“although an employer’s selection of a less qualified candidate can 
support a finding that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the 
hiring was pretextual, it is the employer’s role to identify those strengths 
that constitute the best qualified applicant.”113  Had the court actually 
been using the motivating factor analysis, it would have been difficult to 
affirm summary judgment with such a fact on the record.  Thus, it seems 
that the Eighth Circuit really employs the McDonnell Douglas sole 
 109. Id. at 735 (internal citations omitted). 
 110. 495 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 111. Id. at 914 n.6 (internal citations omitted). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 916 (quoting Kincaid v. City of Omaha, 318 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
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factor analysis at the summary judgment stage, making it much more 
difficult for plaintiffs to defeat such a motion. 
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
has held that: 
when responding to a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff is 
presented with a choice regarding how to establish his or her case.  
[Plaintiff] may proceed by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or 
alternatively, may simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence 
demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated 
[defendant].114 
The court subsequently clarified this standard, noting that a plaintiff 
“may prove either that he was not promoted ‘because of’ his race 
(‘single-motive’) or that race was a ‘motivating factor’ in the County’s 
decision (‘mixed-motive’) . . . [Plainitff] need not identify in advance 
which type of case he is attempting to prove.”115  This standard, as 
opposed to that of the Eighth Circuit, seems to be much more favorable 
towards plaintiffs at the summary judgment phase.  The remainder of 
Part V tests this hypothesis by examining four sets of matched 
employment discrimination cases, all decided after the Desert Palace 
decision.  This Part examines whether these cases, with similar factual 
scenarios, result in a different legal outcome depending on which 
standard they are decided under.  To locate these cases, a search of all 
cases in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits containing the terms “McDonnell 
Douglas” and “Desert Palace” was performed.  It is interesting to note 
that there were many more cases in the Ninth Circuit reversing summary 
judgment in favor of the employer than in the Eighth Circuit.116  For 
each matched case below, the facts and the appeals court’s reasoning is 
discussed followed by a comparison of the two cases.  The matched case 
approach is used as a way of comparing factually similar cases in order 
to compare whether different legal frameworks affect the outcome.  
Admittedly the cases do not have identical facts and the analysis will not 
be perfect in controlling for these differences.  To the extent possible, 
however, the cases are very similar in their facts and should provide a 
strong mechanism of comparison. 
 114. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 
1180 (2008). 
 115. Gibson v. King County, 256 F. App’x 39, 41 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 116. In the six years since Desert Palace was decided, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the 
employer (either upholding a grant of summary judgment or reversing a denial of such a judgment) in a 
mixed-motives case about as many times as it overruled such a judgment.  In contrast, in those same 
years, the Eighth Circuit ruled for the employer (either upholding summary judgment or reversing a 
denial of summary judgment) about six times as often as it held in favor of the employee. 
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The matched cases examined are visually presented in the table that 
follows: 
 
Eighth Circuit Ninth Circuit 
Sallis v. University of Minnesota, 
408 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 2005). 
Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada 
Transportation Department, 424 
F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Maxfield v. Cintad Corp., No. 2, 
427 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2005). 
Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 
919 (9th Cir. 2007). 
Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 
F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006). 
Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit 
Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 
2006).  
Montes v. Greater Twin Cities 
Youth Symphonies (GTCYS), 2008 
WL 3927231 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 
2008). 
Gibson v. King County, 256 Fed. 
Appx. 39 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(unpublished). 
Sallis v. University of Minnesota 
Facts of Sallis 
Appellant, James Sallis, an African-American male, worked as a 
delivery person at the University of Minnesota.117  He was transferred to 
the Fourth Street Parking Ramp as a result of reassignment caused by 
layoffs.118  After his transfer, he sought, but was not hired for three other 
positions at the University of Minnesota.119  The first position he applied 
for, third-shift general maintenance supervisor, was chosen by a panel of 
three interviewers.120  They each rated Sallis lower in several categories 
than the applicant who received the job, although Sallis did have more 
supervisory experience than the candidate who received the job.121  The 
second position was a mechanic position which required technical 
knowledge and skills.122  Sallis possessed less training time and field 
experience than the other applicant.123  The third position was that of 
athletic equipment worker with the University of Minnesota football 
 
 117. Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 472 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 118. Id. at 472–73. 
 119. Id. at 473. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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team.124  He was also denied this position and contended that the denial 
was based on his race.125  During the time he had worked at the Fourth 
Street Parking Ramp, his supervisor called him “tan” in front of others, 
and he had also heard a parking attendant use the racial epithet “niggers” 
and complain “about ‘all of the damn Somalians.’”126  Sallis brought 
suit for racial discrimination in the United States Court for the District of 
Minnesota.127  The district court granted the university’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that even if Sallis made a prima facie case 
of discrimination for failure to promote, Sallis was not able to show that 
the university proffered reasons for its decisions were pretextual.128 
Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment.129  Sallis argued that the district court had 
misapplied Desert Palace.130  The Eighth Circuit disagreed, noting that 
Desert Palace only applies to mixed motive cases, and since “Sallis 
produced no convincing evidence, circumstantial or direct, that race 
motivated UM’s decisions not to promote him, [w]e therefore proceed 
under McDonnell Douglas.”131  The court concluded, in accordance with 
the district court, that Sallis’s claim failed under McDonnell Douglas 
because he could not show that the university’s proffered reasons for not 
hiring him were illegitimate.132  The court noted that “Sallis failed to 
offer evidence in response [to UM’s proffered reasons] showing that 
UM’s qualification claim was pretextual and that the actual motivating 
factor was race discrimination.”133 
Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transportation Dept. 
Facts of Dominguez-Curry 
Sylvia Dominguez-Curry worked under the supervision of Rob Stacey 
in the Nevada Department of Transportation’s contract compliance 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 474. 
 129. Id. at 478. 
 130. Id. at 474. 
 131. Id. at 475. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 475–476. 
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division.134  According to Dominguez-Curry, Stacey often made 
demeaning comments to and about women.135  For instance, Stacey had 
told Dominguez-Curry and other women in her department that “he 
wished he could get men to do [their] jobs” and “women should only be 
in subservient positions.”136  He also expressed concern about women 
with children working at the company.137  Stacey was eventually 
promoted to Contract Compliance Manager, and around the same time, 
the department announced an opening in the division for the Program 
Officer III position.138  Stacey and another employee, Elicegui, made the 
hiring decision and both independently chose a male candidate, Phillip 
Andrews, rather than Dominguez-Curry.139  Dominguez-Curry admitted 
Andrews “was very qualified, and he may be more qualified than me, 
but that was not the—I just knew because he had the right body parts is 
why he got hired, in addition to being qualified.”140  Stacey contended 
that gender did not influence his decision and that the new hire’s 
qualifications were simply superior.141  Dominguez-Curry brought suit 
against the Nevada Transportation Department and Stacey, alleging, 
inter alia, failure to promote based on sex discrimination.142  The district 
court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that 
Dominguez-Curry did not present evidence that the defendant’s 
proffered legitimate reason was a pretext for sex discrimination.143 
Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
Dominguez-Curry appealed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding “that appellees’ 
decision not to hire Dominguez was motivated at least in part by her 
gender.”144  The court reasoned that: 
 Even if it were uncontested that Andrew’s qualifications were 
superior, this would not preclude a finding of discrimination.  An 
employer may be held liable under Title VII even if it had a legitimate 
reason for its employment decision, as long as an illegitimate reason was 
 134. Domingues-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1032. 
 139. Id. at 1033. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1033–34. 
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a motivating factor in the decision . . . Here, the evidence ultimately may 
permit a finding that appellees had a legitimate reason for hiring Andrews 
over Dominguez.  However, because a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that the hiring decision was motivated at least in part by her 
gender, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
the [defendant].145 
The court cited Desert Palace in its reasoning and noted that: “the 
plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a violation through a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . that a protected characteristic played 
‘a motivating factor.’  To overcome summary judgment, a plaintiff 
merely must raise a triable issue as to this question.  Dominguez has met 
this burden.”146 
Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
It is striking to note not only the difference in outcomes in Sallis and 
Dominguez-Curry, but also the difference in reasoning that led to those 
results.  The Eighth Circuit was adamant in its refusal to even consider 
that Sallis’s supervisor’s remarks may have indicated a bias that 
influenced the decision-making process.  Rather, the court steadfastly 
asserted that the case was not a mixed motive case and that there was no 
evidence that race played a motivating factor in the decision-making 
process even though the candidate hired for one of the positions may 
actually have been less qualified than Sallis. 
In stark contrast to this logic, the Ninth Circuit in Dominguez-Curry 
held that it was possible that sex may have played a factor on the 
company’s failure to promote the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff 
herself admitted that she was less qualified than the person actually 
hired.  The Ninth Circuit used the reasoning of Desert Palace to 
conclude that the possibility of gender discrimination was not foreclosed 
simply because the defendant may also have had legitimate reasons for 
making the decision that it did. 
The differences in the two circuits’ interpretation of Desert Palace in 
these cases led to a difference in whether plaintiff got before a jury on 
his or her claims of discrimination.  As discussed in Part III supra, such 
a difference can be crucial in an employment discrimination case, 
leading not only to a possible victory for plaintiff in court, but also 
greatly increasing the potential for settlement.  A further exploration of 
other cases in which the Eighth and Ninth Circuits employed Desert 
Palace differently will help to illustrate more clearly the potential 
 145. Id. at 1040–41 (internal citations omitted). 
 146. Id. at 1042 (internal citation omitted). 
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impact the differing standards have on Title VII litigation. 
Maxfield v. Cintas Corp., No. 2 
Facts of Maxfield 
Darold Maxfield, an African-American male, worked for Cintas 
Corporation as a facility outside sales representative from May 2000 
until his discharge in August 2002.147  Maxfield was also in the United 
States Army and was granted, several military leaves during his time at 
Cintas.148  Maxfield did well at Cintas for a while.149  Then, in May 
2001, for the first time, his draw exceeded his commission.150  This 
continued until July 2001.151  At that time, he took another military 
leave of absence.152  While on leave, he was transferred to a different 
position.153  In January 2002, he was placed in another position, which 
he believed to be a demotion.154  In August 2002, Randy Lewis, the 
general manager of the facility, suspended Maxfield because Maxfiled 
tried to take sick/emergency leave while on military leave.155  Lewis 
told Maxfield that this was against company policy and that “he had 
stolen from the company.”156  Cintas terminated Maxfield four days 
later.157  Cintas actually allowed employees to take sick leave while on 
military leave.158  Maxfield brought suit against Cintas for race 
discrimination pursuant to Title VII as well as violations of the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act in 
relation to his military leave.159  The district court granted summary 
judgment for Cintas on both counts and Maxfield appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eig 160
 147. Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 547–49 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 148. Id. at 547–48. 
 149. Id. at 547. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 547–48. 
 155. Id. at 549. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment on Maxfield’s race discrimination claim.161  The court 
assumed that Maxfield had asserted a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination based on his demotion and subsequent discharge.162  The 
court, however, held that Cintas had articulated legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons for these actions and that Maxfield had not 
shown those reasons to be a pretext for discrimination.163  As to the 
demotion, the court held that although Maxfield offered evidence that a 
white employee, who ran a deficit for two months, had not been 
transferred, this was insufficient because Maxfield had run a deficit for 
four months.164  The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Cintas on Maxfield’s claim of discriminatory termination even 
though Maxfield was able to show that Cintas’s proffered reason for 
firing him—that he took sick leave concurrently with military leave in 
violation of company policy—was not actually true.165  The court relied 
on St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,166 discussed supra note 42, to hold 
that even though Maxfield had discredited Cintas’s proffered non-
discriminatory reason, this was not sufficient to surmount a motion for 
summary judgment because there was no showing that discrimination 
was the actual reason for the termination.167 
Metoyer v. Chassman 
Facts of Metoyer 
In March 1998, Patricia Metoyer, an African-American female, was 
hired as Executive Administrator by the Screen Actors Guild (SAG).168  
At that time, she was promised that she would shortly be elevated to the 
soon-to-be-created position of Affirmative Action Director.169  Over one 
year later, when the promotion still had not occurred, Metoyer petitioned 
the SAG’s Senior Staff to create the position; this request was denied by 
 161. Id. at 549–50 (The court reversed and remanded on the USERRA claim.). 
 162. Id. at 550. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 167. Maxfield, 427 F.3d at 550–51. 
 168. Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 923–24 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed, 553 U.S. 1049, 
(2008). 
 169. Id. at 924. 
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John McGuire, the SAG’s Acting Executive National Director.170  Linda 
Schick, the National Director of Human Resources, explained to 
Metoyer that “[t]here are no people of color on senior staff, and it’s very 
unlikely that there will be.”171 
During the course of her employment with the SAG, Metoyer said she 
was approached by minority employees who had complaints of racial 
discrimination.172  She alleged that the supervisors receiving her 
complaints responded with racist comments.173  She was also told she 
was “too outspoken.”174  During the course of her time at the SAG, 
Metoyer became concerned about irregularities with grant money at the 
organization.175  In particular, she questioned the allocation of funds on 
several grants which were mandated to have affirmative action 
components and projects in them.176  Metoyer, however, was also the 
subject of an investigation into the inappropriate use of grant funds, and 
Metoyer eventually admitted to some of the suspected misuse.177  After 
this admission, she was suspended with pay and eventually fired for 
inappropriate use of the funds.178 
Metoyer brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination 
and retaliation.  As the Ninth Circuit noted in its opinion, § 1981 claims 
are analyzed using “the same legal principles as those applicable to a 
Title VII disparate treatment case.”179  Thus, the court allows the 
plaintiff to surmount a summary judgment challenge using the 
McDonnell Douglas framework or by producing “direct or 
circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more 
likely than not motivated [the employer].”180  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the employer and Metoyer appealed.181 
Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 925. 
 174. Id. at 925–26. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 925. 
 177. Id. at 929. 
 178. Id. at 930. 
 179. Id. (quoting Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 180. Id. at 931 (quoting Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
 181. Id. at 923. 
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judgment on Metoyer’s wrongful termination and retaliation claims.182  
Regarding the wrongful termination claim, the court held that although 
the SAG claimed that Metoyer was terminated because of the audit, 
which showed she had misappropriated more than $30,000 in grant 
funds, there was also evidence of racial animus by employees at the 
SAG that could have influenced the decision-making process.183  As the 
court wrote, “[t]he plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a 
violation through a preponderance of the evidence . . . that a protected 
characteristic played a motivating factor.  To overcome summary 
judgment, a plaintiff merely must raise a triable issue as to this 
question.”184  Thus, the court held that it was inappropriate for the 
district court to grant summary judgment to the defendant because the 
plaintiff had adduced evidence that race may have been a motivating 
factor in her firing, in addition to defendant’s proffered legitimate reason 
for terminating her employment.185 
Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
These cases demonstrate an interesting contrast in the outcomes to 
which differing standards at summary judgment can lead.  In Maxfield, 
although the defendant’s proffered legitimate reason was shown to be 
untrue and although an arguably similarly-situated white employee was 
not fired for the same lackluster performance, the Eighth Circuit 
steadfastly asserted that the plaintiff had been unable to adduce enough 
evidence at summary judgment to show that racial discrimination was 
the real reason for the termination.  In stark contrast in Metoyer, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to the employer, 
despite the employer’s truthful proffered reason that the termination was 
due to plaintiff’s misappropriation of $30,000 of grant funds because the 
court could not rule out the possibility that racial animus also factored 
into the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment. 
The importance of the legal standard in a discrimination case becomes 
apparent from these two cases.  The use of Desert Palace’s motivating 
factor analysis at summary judgment allows cases, like Metoyer, to 
proceed to trial even where the plaintiff admittedly engaged in 
wrongdoing on the job because the Desert Palace standard is not based 
on the notion that there can be only one reason for an employment 
decision.  Strict adherence to the McDonnell Douglas analysis results in 
 182. Id. at 942. 
 183. Id. at 939. 
 184. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 185. Id. 
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the curtailment of potentially legitimate discrimination claims at 
summary judgment simply because a plaintiff cannot show that 
defendant’s real reason—and the only reason allowed in the eyes of 
courts adhering to this standard—was discrimination. 
Arraleh v. County of Ramsey 
Facts of Arraleh 
The County of Ramsey (the County) hired Rashid Arraleh, an 
African-American Muslim, as a temporary Employment Guidance 
Counselor in its Workforce Solutions Program in 2002.186  During his 
employment, Arraleh often double-booked or missed client 
appointments.187  He claimed that such practices were not unusual in the 
Workforce Solutions Program.188  Two coworkers supported Arraleh’s 
assertion.189  Arraleh claimed that his supervisor, Terry Zurn, treated 
him differently than white employees by keeping a complaint log for 
Arraleh, which was not kept for white employees.190  Arraleh claimed 
that he overheard coworkers use the terms “those people” and “those 
damn Muslims” around him and told him that people of African dissent 
are “emotional.”191  He also overheard a conversation between a County 
employee and Zurn during which the employee told Zurn that hiring 
Arraleh is like “raising terrorist kids.”192  Arraleh was considered for 
two permanent positions at the County, but was not hired for either.193  
Patricia Brady, the director of Workforce Solutions, who had previously 
approved Arraleh’s temporary employment, made the final decision not 
to hire him permanently, along with Zurn.194  Arraleh also claimed that 
Brady had once told African-American employees that they needed to 
“leave their blackness behind.”195  Arraleh sued the County for 
discrimination based on race and national origin due to, inter alia, their 
failure to hire him in the permanent positions for which he was 
considered.196  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
 186. Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 972. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 972–73. 
 192. Id. at 973. 
 193. Id. at 973–74. 
 194. Id. at 971, 974. 
 195. Id. at 974. 
 196. Id. at 970–71. 
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the County on all counts and Arraleh appealed.197 
Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment on Arraleh’s failure to hire claim, holding that, even if Arraleh 
presented a prima facie case of disparate treatment, he failed to show 
that the County’s proffered legitimate reason—that the education and 
work experience of the candidate selected best fit the requirements for 
the position—was pretextual.198  The court specifically noted that the 
fact that Zurn had previously decided to hire Arraleh, six months before, 
“suggests that racial and national origin discrimination were not the 
motivating factors behind the adverse employment action.”199  
Additionally, the court reasoned that since the employees subsequently 
hired for the jobs Arraleh applied for were all minorities, with the one 
exception, it was not the court’s job to sit as a super-personnel 
department and grant summary judgment.200 
Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union 
Facts of Cornwell 
Electra Central Credit Union (Electra) hired Raymond Cornwell, an 
African-American male, as its Director of Lending in August 1993 and 
subsequently promoted him to Chief Operating Officer.201  Under his 
supervision, Electra’s loan portfolio grew dramatically until 2001, 
suffering somewhat of a decrease after that.202  Cornwell was the only 
African-American member of the management team.203  In September 
2001, Jim Sharp became the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
Electra.204  After Sharp became CEO, he often excluded Cornwell from 
management team meetings, and allegedly made inappropriate 
comments about women.205  Cornwell also alleged that Sharp made 
racial comments about an African-American employee at the 
 197. Id. at 971. 
 198. Id. at 976. 
 199. Id. at 977 (emphasis added). 
 200. Id. at 976–78. 
 201. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d. 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1023. 
 204. Id. at 1022. 
 205. Id. at 1022, 1032. 
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company.206  In December 2001, Sharp informed the management team 
that he intended to reorganize operations, which resulted in demoting 
Cornwell to Vice President of Lending.207  A Caucasian woman was 
hired to take over some of his duties.208  Cornwell was the only member 
of the management team demoted.209  After complaining about what he 
perceived to be a racially motivated demotion, Cornwell offered not to 
sue Electra for race discrimination if Electra offered him a severance 
package.  Electra terminated Cornwell’s employment and replaced him 
with an African-American female.210  Cornwell sued Electra for race 
discrimination pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.211  The 
district court granted summary judgment for Electra and Cornwell 
appealed.212 
Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
The Ninth Circuit purportedly analyzed this case under the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, but noted that, after Desert Palace: 
it is not particularly significant whether [plaintiff] relies on the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption, or whether [plaintiff] relies on direct or 
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent to meet his burden.  
Under either approach, [plaintiff] must produce some evidence suggesting 
that [the employment decision] was due in part or whole to 
discriminatory intent . . . . 213 
With regard to Cornwell’s demotion, the court held that he produced 
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether defendants demoted him because of his race.214  Specifically, 
the court reasoned: 
[t]he truth might be that all of Sharp’s management aims were legitimate 
and matters of prerogative and personal style.  But a jury could also find 
on the summary judgment record that a discriminatory intention was at 
work, and in our view [plaintiff] presented sufficient evidence to place 
this issue in the jury’s province for decision.215 
 206. Id. at 1025. 
 207. Id. at 1023. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 1022–25. 
 211. Id. at 1022. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1030 (emphasis added, internal citation omitted). 
 214. Id. at 1032. 
 215. Id. at 1034. 
39
Bucciarelli Pedersen: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  3:45:55 PM 
136 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
The divergence in outcomes in the cases is striking.  In Arraleh, as in 
Cornwell, the court was presented with an employee who was not doing 
exceedingly well in his job.  In each case, the employee alleged that 
discriminatory remarks had been made in the workplace and that 
underlying racial animus had contributed to the adverse employment 
decision.  In fact, in Arraleh, the actual decision-makers partook in these 
racist conversations.  However, the Eighth Circuit seemed to attribute 
great weight to the fact that the same people who hired Arraleh were the 
ones who fired him and thus, could not have been discriminatory in their 
hiring. 
Although the situation differed in the Ninth Circuit case, it clear that 
the Ninth Circuit’s motivating factor analysis would likely not afford the 
so-called “same decision-maker defense” dispositive weight.  If one 
argues that the Ninth Circuit analysis is more realistic in terms of how 
decisions are actually made, then it is entirely possible that a decision-
maker could hire a person of a certain race for a variety of reasons, 
including, perhaps, an affirmative action mandate on hiring, and then 
fire that person as soon as a seemingly legitimate reason presents itself.  
In that case, race would have played a motivating factor in both the 
hiring and discharge decisions.216  The Eighth Circuit does not allow for 
this possibility, assuming instead that the decision-maker, who hires a 
minority worker, does not take race into account at the hiring stage and 
therefore, could not do so at the termination stage either.  Such thinking 
does not comport with the realities of the employment setting.  As 
Krieger and Fiske have noted: 
 There are well-founded reasons for believing that implicit bias will 
express itself less readily in the hiring context than later in the 
employment relationship.  In particular, the hiring context tends to make 
equal employment opportunity (EEO) norms and goals salient.  As such, 
managers may be more vigilant about inhibiting responses based on 
stereotypes or other implicit attitudes.  Moreover, during the hiring 
process, human-resources specialists or EEO managers may play a role in 
selecting applicants for a “short list,” may be present at interviews, or 
may review decisions for compliance with the employer’s EEO policies 
and goals.  Where this occurs, the person who actually makes the hiring 
decision may be influenced in ways that blunt the effects of any implicit 
stereotypes he holds.  However, this influence may wane as time goes on 
 216. Affirmative action programs of private employers are legally acceptable if they are 
temporary, used in a job category in which there is a manifest demographic imbalance, and do not 
unnecessarily trample the rights of innocent third parties.  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 
(1987). 
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and equal opportunity goals become less prominent. 
. . . . 
 There is, in short, little reason to believe that an implicitly biased 
employment decision maker who has hired a stereotyped person will 
necessarily succeed in keeping his or her subsequent evaluations of that 
person’s performance free from the influence of implicit stereotypes.217 
The notion that attitudes may change or at least manifest themselves 
differently according to the situation is in contrast to the notion that a 
person’s attitudes (i.e., his or her disposition) is constant over time and 
context.  As Krieger and Fiske note, “[P]eople, including judges, have a 
tendency to overestimate the role of stable traits or tastes and to 
underestimate the role of situational variables in shaping social 
perception and behavior.”218  Psychological research has shown that the 
former view of personality is often more consistent with the actualities 
of the work setting.219  Thus, incorporating the Ninth Circuit’s 
motivating factor analysis into the disparate treatment framework allows 
judges to at least entertain the possibility that the same decision-maker 
has both hired and fired a minority worker or woman.  Therefore, it is 
not a foregone conclusion that racial or gender biases could not have 
played a factor in the decision to terminate the employee.  There is 
simply no room for such behavioral realities in the Eighth Circuit’s 
single factor McDonnell Douglas analysis. 
Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies 
Facts of Montes 
Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies (GTCYS) hired Dr. Jean 
Montes as its Artistic Director in July 2003.220  Dr. Montes was born in 
Haiti and immigrated to the United States when he was approximately 
eighteen years old.221  During the course of his employment with 
GTCYS, board members often characterized Montes as African-
American and the president of the board, Charlie Feuss, allegedly 
referred to Montes on several occasions as la bête noire of the 
organization.222  The phrase’s literal translation is “the black beast,” 
though it has been incorporated into the English language to mean “one 
 217. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at 1051–52. 
 218. Id. at 1040. 
 219. Id. at 1050. 
 220. Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies, 540 F.3d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 854. 
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that is particularly disliked or that is to be avoided.”223  Montes alleged 
that he often felt as if he was not welcomed or supported at GTYCS, 
citing as examples the fact that the board once asked him to restructure 
the orchestra to reduce costs and approved his recommendation to 
reassign two conductors.224  However, when others later opposed the 
decision, the board did not support Montes.225  Additionally, a board 
member suggested that the board form an African-American Committee 
to assist Montes’s transition to the community.226 
David Ranheim, the interim Executive Director at GTCYS, often 
demeaned and belittled Montes, calling him “an African conductor.”227  
Montes stated that he discussed Ranheim’s conduct with Feuss, but 
nothing was done.228  The Board reprimanded Montes for recruiting 
GYCYS members to attend the Allegro Music Camp, with whom 
Montes was also employed.229  Montes stated that it was a tradition for 
GTCYS personnel to participate in the camp, and he had discussed the 
recruitment with the former president of GTCYS.230  The board 
ultimately terminated Montes when he refused to sign a Counseling 
Report unless the whole board agreed he should sign it.  The report 
basically acknowledged that he had taken the position with Allegro 
without board authority and that he agreed to consult with the board 
before taking any future outside jobs.231  One board member actually 
resigned over Montes’s termination, writing in his resignation letter that 
“certain perceptions about Dr. Montes have been based on incomplete 
information, inaccurate details, biases, and misunderstandings.”232  
Montes sued GTYCS for racial and national origin discrimination 
pursuant to Title VII based on his termination; the district court granted 
summary judgment for GYTCS and Montes appealed.233 
Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 855. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 855–56. 
 232. Id. at 856. 
 233. Id. at 856–57. 
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judgment for GTYCS.234  The circuit court held that Montes was unable 
to show, pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, that GYTCS’s 
proffered reason for terminating Montes was pretextual because he was 
unwilling to cooperate with board and staff members.235  The district 
court stated that the suggestion about the African-American committee 
was not evidence of discrimination because it was made in the context of 
Montes’s hiring, not his termination, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.236  
The circuit court concluded by noting: “While use of the phrase la bête 
noire gives us pause, we conclude that the evidence taken as a whole is 
insufficient to permit a reasonable jury, without resort to speculation, to 
draw [an] inference that the board terminated Montes’s employment 
because of his race or national origin.”237 
Gibson v. King County 
Facts of Gibson 
John Gibson, an African-American employee of the King County fire 
department, brought suit against the county for discriminatory failure to 
promote on account of race pursuant to Title VII.238  Gibson alleged that 
the Interim Assistant Fire Marshal and the Fire Marshal made 
discriminatory remarks to him during the course of his employment and 
both of these individuals had some influence in the promotion 
decision.239  When he applied for a promotion to the position of 
Assistant Fire Marshal, the Fire Marshal told him he was more 
comfortable with the white candidate being promoted, and the Interim 
Assistant Fire Marshal told Gibson he was different, which prevented 
his promotion.240  Of note, the investigation unit had not employed any 
African-American employees, other than Gibson, in over twenty years, 
and the interview panels assembled by the Fire Marshal contained no 
racial minorities.241  The district court granted judgment as a matter of 
 234. Id. at 860. 
 235. Id. at 858. 
 236. Id. at 857. 
 237. Id. at 859 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 238. Gibson v. King County, 256 F. App’x 39, 40 (9th Cir. 2007).  Although the opinion is 
unpublished, it is still pertinent to this Article because it demonstrates the difference in outcomes that 
may result from differing standards at summary judgment and beyond.  The opinion is not being 
analyzed in light of any precedential value, and therefore, its publication status is of no consequence for 
the current purposes. 
 239. Id. at 41. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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law242 for the County and Gibson appealed.243 
Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the employer on the failure-to-promote claim.244  
The court set out the legal framework for analyzing whether judgment as 
a matter of law was appropriate: Gibson may prove either that he was 
not promoted: 
“because of” his race (“single-motive”) or that his race was a “motivating 
factor” in the County’s decision (“mixed-motive”). . . . Gibson need not 
identify in advance which type of case he is attempting to prove; rather, 
the district court will determine the appropriate standard on which to 
instruct the jury upon deciding “what legal conclusions the evidence 
could reasonably support.”245 
The court reasoned that viewing the discriminatory remarks made to 
Gibson by both the Interim Assistant Fire Marshal and the Fire Marshal 
in conjunction with their influence over the promotion decision and the 
absence of black employees in the fire department, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that race was a motivating factor in the employment 
decision.246  Additionally, the court noted that the decision-making 
process was highly subjective and that “subjective practices are 
particularly susceptible to discriminatory abuse and should be closely 
scrutinized.”247 
Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning 
The Eighth Circuit once again demonstrated the rigidity of the single 
motive analysis, noting its discomfort with the term la bête noire, but 
refusing to allow this consideration to dominate the analysis.  In 
contrast, if the Eighth Circuit were using a motivating factor analysis 
akin to what the Ninth Circuit employs, it could have stated that the 
 242. The standard for judgment as a matter of law is similar to that for summary judgment, except 
that it requires a finding, by the judge that, after a party has been heard on an issue, a “reasonable jury 
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
50(a). 
 243. Gibson, 256 F. App’x at 40. 
 244. Id. at 42. 
 245. Id. at 41 (quoting Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), 
aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)). 
 246. Id. at 42. 
 247. Id. at 41 (quoting Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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reason given by GYTCS was legitimate, but that the surrounding 
circumstances, including the la bête noire comment indicated that race 
was potentially a motivating factor.  This would have allowed a jury to 
evaluate the claim in its entirety instead of the case being completely 
dismissed on summary judgment. 
Additionally, it is interesting that the Ninth Circuit in Gibson 
embraced an even more liberal interpretation of the motivating factor 
analysis by allowing a plaintiff to refrain from asserting under which 
framework to pursue and to present all evidence, which allows the court 
to decide the more appropriate framework.  Such a standard results in 
more cases surviving summary judgment and results in more cases going 
to a jury if a protected characteristic can possibly be considered to have 
been at least a motivating factor in the decision. 
The difference in legal standards articulated by the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits in disparate treatment cases leads to different outcomes.  In 
particular, the Eighth Circuit’s standard results in most cases being 
dismissed at the summary judgment phase while the Ninth Circuit’s 
motivating factor analysis allows more cases to proceed to trial.  Part VI 
discusses the importance of this implication. 
VI. POTENTIAL FOR DETECTION OF IMPLICIT BIAS 
As discussed in Part V, the differing approaches that the Eighth and 
the Ninth Circuits take in individual disparate treatment cases at the 
summary judgment stage have implications for the plaintiff’s likelihood 
of success in the case.  Employing the motivating factor standard at 
summary judgment allows greater opportunity for a case to at least 
survive the summary judgment phase of litigation and proceed to trial.  
This seemingly obvious premise is bolstered by the analysis in Part V, 
demonstrating the difference in outcomes that arise when a motivating 
factor as opposed to a single factor analysis is used at the summary 
judgment stage.  As discussed in Part V, however, this difference in 
outcomes could have a potentially huge impact on the success of 
plaintiffs in making it past summary judgment, and on the law’s ability 
to help uncover implicit bias.  The analysis in this Part proceeds in two 
stages.  First, this Part analyzes the literature on the automatic nature of 
stereotypes and the ways in which such stereotypes can be mitigated.  
Then, it ties these findings to the notion that if judges, under the 
motivating factor analysis, are more likely to deny summary judgment to 
defendants in employment discrimination cases, employers may be 
forced, at the time the employment decision is made, to give serious 
thought to all the reasons underlying the decision.  If this is true, implicit 
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bias may be brought to the forefront and potentially counteracted, at 
least for some employers. 
A. The Automatic Nature of Stereotypes and the Potential for Control 
Wilson and Brekke have described the operation of automatic 
stereotypes as “mental contamination.”248  They define mental 
contamination as “the process whereby a person ends with an unwanted 
judgment, emotion, or behavior because of mental processing that is 
unconscious or uncontrollable (again, ‘unwanted’ in the sense that the 
judgment maker would prefer not to be influenced by the mental 
processes in question).”249  This automatic nature of stereotypes has 
been identified by other researchers as well.250  Automatic stereotypes 
differ from conscious prejudices in that the decision-maker is not aware 
of their activation during the decision-making process. 
Automatic stereotypes can operate in a number of different ways.  
Stereotypes can affect the way we “perceive, store and remember 
information.”251  For example, stereotypes about a certain group 
engender certain expectations about that group.  This can affect 
perception of certain information in the following way: individuals are 
more likely to take in information that conforms to their expectations of 
a certain group—expectations caused by a stereotype they hold—than 
information that conflicts with those expectations.  Thus, individuals are 
more likely to be attentive to stereotype-confirming behavior in others 
than to behavior that contradicts such stereotypes.  This phenomenon is 
known as the confirmation bias.252  This may be problematic in the 
employment context when a decision-maker, holding certain 
expectations about race or gender, seeks out the behavior of individuals 
in these groups in order to confirm their expectation.  For example, 
assume that the supervisor in the White case discussed in Part I had an 
 248. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 15, at 118. 
 249. Id. at 119. 
 250. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 27, at 242 (noting that “[p]eople may often not be aware of what 
they are doing . . . the operation of stereotypes and prejudice may be outside of their control”); John A. 
Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in 
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 363 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) 
(tracing the emergence of the automatic stereotype theory); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and 
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6–7 
(1989) (discussing the possibility of inhibiting automatic stereotypes); Fiske, supra note 15, at 357 
(explaining that stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination have automatic aspects as well as “socially 
pragmatic aspects” which serve to sustain them). 
 251. Page, supra note 58, at 160. 
 252. See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 238 
(1993). 
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expectation, stemming from a stereotype, that African-American 
employees are less competent than Caucasian employees.  Cognitive 
research indicates that the supervisor, in writing White’s evaluation, 
would be more likely to search out information that confirms White’s 
incompetency and disregard information that contradicts that 
expectation.  Additionally, psychological research has also shown that 
the supervisor may tend to employ the fundamental attribution error in 
order to retain the consistency of his expectations.  The fundamental 
attribution error is the “overreadiness to explain behavior in terms of 
dispositional factors,” as opposed to situational factors.253  In other 
words, the supervisor above would likely interpret any acts of 
incompetence by White as a product of his disposition (i.e., his general 
incompetence), and ignore any situational factors that may have 
contributed to these actions.  Moreover, actors are more likely to 
attribute their own behavior and that of those in their in-group to 
situational factors, whereas these same actors are more likely to attribute 
the actions of members of their out-group to dispositional factors.254  
Additionally, ambiguous information is likely to be interpreted 
differently dependent upon one’s expectations as influenced by the 
stereotypes one holds.255 
Expectations have also been shown to influence one’s memory about 
another individual.256  Just as one tends to seek out information that 
confirms one’s expectations, one also tends to better remember 
expectation-consistent information.257  Again, in the White case, this 
translates to the supervisor’s tendency to better remember White’s less 
competent acts when evaluating him. 
The question is whether these automatic stereotypes can be controlled 
in some way by the decision-maker himself.  The research indicates that 
under certain conditions they can be controlled.  Although most agree 
that it is difficult for these automatic stereotypes to be controlled, there 
is also agreement that it is possible if certain conditions are met.  
Specifically, researchers have found that the effects of the automatic 
stereotypes can be controlled by the decision-maker if: (1) the decision-
maker is aware of the unconscious stereotype’s operation; and (2) the 
decision-maker is motivated to do something about it.258  For instance, 
 253. Id. at 180. 
 254. See id. at 181. 
 255. See Heilman & Haynes, supra note 48, at 130 (“One of the most robust findings in the 
expectancy literature is that expectations can exert a substantial impact on how information is 
interpreted, particularly when information is ambiguous . . . .”). 
 256. Id. at 131. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See Bargh, supra note 250, at 371; Blair, supra note 27, at 247–48; Fiske, supra note 15, at 
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one study found that in completing the IAT, discussed supra Part II, 
“White participants exhibited significantly less automatic negativity 
toward Blacks in the presence of a Black experimenter than in the 
presence of a White experimenter.”259  Additionally, when the African-
American experimenter instructed subjects to “be the least prejudiced 
you can” subjects produced lower levels of automatic prejudice.260  It is 
important to remember that the IAT is based on implicit associations 
between positive and negative words and African-American and 
Caucasian and thus, measures implicit, not explicit bias.  As Blair 
concludes, “highly motivated individuals can modify the automatic 
operation of stereotypes and prejudice.”261 
Aside from context-specific motivators, studies have also shown that 
decision-makers who are told to try to suppress their use of stereotypes 
can alter the effects of automatic stereotypes.262  For instance, as 
Kawakami, Dovidio, Mill, Hermsen and Russin demonstrated: 
[P]articipants who had been trained to say “no” to stereotypic events and 
“yes” to nonstereotypic events produced significantly lower levels of 
automatic stereotypes, compared to that produced by participants who had 
received no training or who had been trained to affirm the stereotypes.  In 
addition, this “stereotype negation” training was successful in moderating 
automatic stereotypes of skinheads and automatic race stereotypes . . . .263 
The key to suppression strategies is that the goal of suppression must be 
“accompanied by a specific implementation intention”—e.g., to judge 
others fairly.264 
Additionally, the promotion of counter-stereotypes may also 
ameliorate the effect of automatic stereotypes.  For instance, a study by 
Blair, Ma, and Lenton, which asked subjects to create and think about 
the mental image of a counter-stereotype (e.g., the strong woman) for 
five minutes, was found to reduce the measure of subjects’ automatic 
gender stereotypes.265  Additionally, a study by Dasgupta and 
Greenwald found that exposure to pictures or video of admired African-
391. 
 259. Blair, supra note 27, at 247 (summarizing Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on 
Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842 (2001)). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id.  Blair also provides a very useful summary table of research on the malleability of 
automatic stereotypes and the results.  Id. at 245–46.  These studies support the contention that 
stereotypes are malleable and can be controlled if certain conditions (e.g., motivation on the part of the 
decision-maker) exist. 
 262. Id. at 248. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 249. 
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Americans and disliked Caucasian Americans, was found to reduce 
subjects’ automatic stereotypes towards African-Americans.266 
In the employment context specifically, Heilman and Haynes note: 
Of relevance is a substantial body of research documenting motivation as 
an important factor in the application of stereotypes.  Specifically, the 
tendency to rely on stereotype-based expectations can give way to more 
controlled and reasoned thought processes when the evaluator is strongly 
motivated to make accurate judgments.  This is likely to occur when: (1) 
the evaluator is in an interdependent relationship with the evaluated such 
that his or her outcomes rely on the accuracy of the evaluation; or (2) the 
evaluator knows that he or she is going to have to account to others for 
the decisions made.  In either of these instances, the influence of 
stereotype-based expectations on evaluations may well be tempered. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [E]vidence that being held accountable makes individuals take 
action and exhibit behaviors (such as being more attentive when 
observing performance and taking more extensive notes when gathering 
information) that better prepares them to justify their ratings, which in 
turn produces more accurate evaluative judgments.  These activities can 
reduce, and perhaps even eliminate, the influence of stereotype-based 
performance expectations on evaluations . . . .267 
Interestingly, Russell Fazio, the creator of the MODE model of 
attitude-behavior processes, concluded, along with his co-author, that 
motivation is a function of the perceived costliness of judgmental 
error.268  That is, the more a decision-maker fears that his decision-
making will be perceived as wrong and possibly prejudiced, the more 
motivated the decision-maker is to avoid the influence of bias on his 
decision-making. 
Thus, this research suggests that the combination of awareness by the 
decision-maker of the implicit stereotypes as well as motivation to 
eliminate them can lead to a reduction in the effect of automatic 
stereotypes.  In the context of employment discrimination, this means 
that a decision-maker may be able to avoid the effect of implicit bias on 
his or her decisions if these two factors are present. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Heilman & Haynes, supra note 48, at 140–42 (internal citations omitted). 
 268. Russell H. Fazio & Tamara Towles-Schwen, The MODE Model of Attitude-Behavior 
Processes, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 114 (Shelly Chaicken & Yaacov Trope 
eds., 1999). 
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B. The Motivating Factor Framework’s Potential for Controlling 
Automatic Stereotypes 
The remaining question is what, if any effect, can the motivating 
factor framework have on the use of automatic stereotypes by 
employers?  The answer is potentially a potent one.  As previously 
discussed and demonstrated by the matched cases analysis, the 
motivating factor analysis places a very low burden on plaintiffs at the 
summary judgment stage of litigation to produce some evidence that an 
illegitimate motive was part of the reason for the adverse employment 
decision made against plaintiff.  As demonstrated by the matched case 
analysis, in the circuits where the motivating factor framework is used at 
summary judgment, more cases could potentially go to trial (or at least 
be settled on their way).  Thus, employers will likely be more concerned 
with the motives of decision-makers within their firms.  Therefore, 
employers, and particularly employer’s counsel, will demand that 
employers attempt to understand and document their thought processes 
at the time the employment decision is made. 
Employment is an area of law particularly accustomed to the role of 
lawyers as counselors and litigators.  For example, many large corporate 
defense firms, as part of their services in the employment field, offer 
seminars to their client’s employees about proper workplace conduct, 
criteria for decision-making processes, or contents of employee 
handbooks.269  It is not uncommon for a supervisor to call corporate 
counsel before making an adverse employment decision in order to 
ensure that he or she will not be inviting meritorious litigation with the 
decision.  The area of sexual harassment law is particularly illustrative.  
In two cases decided on the same day, the Supreme Court ruled that an 
employer is subject to vicarious liability for the harassment of an 
employee that does not result in tangible action by that employee’s 
 269. See, e.g., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Labor and Employment Law, 
http://www.skadden.com/default.cfm (follow “Practices” hyperlink; then follow “Labor and 
Employment Law” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 16, 2009) (noting that the firm “[a]ssist[s] clients in 
identifying and avoiding employment-related problems before they occur, including through use of 
internal employment audits”); Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Employment Counseling & Litigation, 
http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm (follow “practices” hyperlink; then follow “D-E” hyperlink; 
then follow “Employment Counseling & Litigation” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (noting that 
the firm conducts “company-wide and management training on a variety of topics, including workplace 
harassment, diversity, and EEO compliance”); Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Labor and Employment 
Litigation, http://www.sullcrom.com/ (follow “More Practices” hyperlink; then follow “Labor and 
Employment Litigation” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 16, 2009) (noting that the firm advises clients with 
respect to routine and complex discrimination and other employment-related issues); Ballard Spahr LLP, 
Labor and Employment, http://www.ballardspahr.com/PracticeAreas/Practices/LaborEmployment (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2009) (noting that the firm offers “[d]ay-to-day counseling on hiring, firing and other 
labor and employment law issues”). 
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supervisor, but could avoid such liability if the employer could show: (1) 
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly 
correct the harassing behavior; and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to otherwise avoid harm.270  As a result of these decisions, 
corporate counsel regularly conducts training sessions on what it means 
for the employer to exercise reasonable care and promptly correct the 
behavior as well as on what corrective opportunities the employer 
should have in place for employees to use should they need them.271  
Former colleagues, who represent corporate clients confirmed that they 
spend at least as much of their time counseling and training their clients’ 
employees about how to avoid employment discrimination litigation as 
they spend actually defending such litigation. 
Another area where doctrine has been quickly incorporated into 
practice involves the contractual nature of employee handbooks.  At one 
time, employers believed they could provide employees with a 
handbook detailing the employers’ procedures and practices, but simply 
disclaim any intent to be contractually bound, rendering the practices 
and policies unenforceable.  In most jurisdictions considering the issue, 
courts have held that this was not the case.272  Rather, the courts require 
that the disclaimer must be in a place likely to be perceived by the 
employee and in language likely to be understood.273  After such 
decisions throughout the United States, it has become standard for 
employers to incorporate prominent, plain-English disclaimers.274  Such 
change is obviously a result of the interpretation of law to practice by an 
employer’s attorneys. 
Thus, in a circuit that uses the motivating factor framework, one can 
imagine employment counsel attempting to delineate to employers what 
process should be undertaken by the decision-maker, as they do in the 
instances of sexual harassment or employment handbooks.  In a 
jurisdiction such as the Ninth Circuit, this would likely include an 
 270. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
 271. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in 
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 961 (1999) (noting the role of 
defense attorneys in counseling employers so as not to run afoul of the law); Scott A. Moss & Peter H. 
Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics 
Can Survive the Demise of the “Rational Actor,” 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 247 (2009) (noting that 
when evaluating harassment prevention programs, courts look only to the formalities of the programs).  
This, in turn, reinforces an employer’s incentive to incorporate legal doctrine into its policies. 
 272. See Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Subjective Approach to Contracts?: How Courts 
Interpret Employee Handbook Disclaimers, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 101, 107 (2008). 
 273. Id. at 108. 
 274. Id. 
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examination of the manager’s actual reasons for the decision.  Perhaps a 
manager would even be required by company policy to write down the 
reasons he or she would use to justify the decision should the affected 
employee decide to bring suit.  While such a requirement may have little 
effect upon the knowingly biased manager, cognitive research indicates 
the potential effect that such requirements could have on those holding 
an implicit bias.  If the effects of automatic stereotypes can be countered 
by the decision-maker’s awareness of the stereotype and the decision-
maker’s motivation to do something about it, then requiring a 
managerial employee to articulate his or her reasons for making an 
adverse employment decision could help counter any role that implicit 
bias may play in employment decisions. 
Additionally, outside counsel, while conducting anti-discrimination 
training designed to provide guidance for those in circuits using the 
motivating factor framework, is likely to remind decision-makers of the 
importance of avoiding the use of race, sex, or other prohibited 
characteristics in the decision-making process.  One can imagine counsel 
repeatedly advising clients that adverse employment decisions 
absolutely cannot be motivated by race or any other prohibited class 
categorization.  While such training will likely be aimed at the conscious 
discriminator, it is actually more likely to have an effect on the 
unconscious discriminator.  While the conscious discriminator will 
simply make a list of all the pretextual reasons motivating a decision, 
when the unconscious discriminator makes her list with counsel’s 
warning about avoiding race or sex-based decisions resonating in the 
background, that decision-maker may actually uncover the fact that such 
prohibited considerations had been playing a role in the decision. 
As discussed supra, in Part VI.A, such awareness, coupled with 
motivation to stem implicit bias, is a key factor in mitigating the effects 
of such bias.  In the employment setting, once the awareness is present, 
the motivation to avoid the effects of implicit bias would be supplied by 
concern over a lawsuit.275  As noted above, Fazio and Towles-Schwen 
found that motivation was a function of the perceived costliness of an 
error in judgment.  For instance, the authors discussed an experiment in 
which “[m]otivation to reach a valid decision was manipulated by 
 275. Although such warnings are a step towards rooting out implicit bias, they may not be the 
most productive way of going about it.  Although not the topic of this Article, social psychology 
research seems to demonstrate that negative reinforcements about what criteria decision-makers should 
not be using is not as effective as other measures.  Therefore, counsel and employers should be 
searching for the most effective ways to use “motivating factor” training to actually root out implicit 
bias.  For instance, employers may require their decision-makers to think about counter-stereotypes 
before making an employment decision or even watch some type of video about implicit bias and ways 
to counteract it. 
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enhancing fear of invalidity for half the participants.”276  Specifically, 
the participants were asked to evaluate two department stores.  The first 
store was described in a generally positive way, although the comments 
about its camera department were negative.  The second store was 
described in a more negative way, but there were positive statements 
about its camera department.  The participants were then asked to decide 
where they would choose to buy a camera.  The participants were told 
that their score selections would be compared to those of the other 
students participating in the session, and that they would have to explain 
their decisions to the experimenter and the other participants.  The 
results of this and other similar experiments demonstrated that motivated 
individuals with sufficient opportunity to reflect tended to rely on more 
deliberative and less automatic processes in making their judgments.  
Thus, the motivated individuals did not simply rely on their overall 
attitude toward each store, but rather “engage[d] in the more effortful 
processing of retrieving and evaluating their beliefs about the camera 
department of the two stores…”277 
These findings highlight the potential impact that the motivating 
factor framework can have.  If more cases make it past summary 
judgment and are able to be evaluated by a factfinder, decision-makers 
will feel pressure to make decisions that will comport with the 
factfinders’ ultimate decisions.  In other words, they will be motivated to 
make less prejudiced decisions in order to avoid the situation where the 
factfinder evaluates their decision and determines that it is biased.  
Additionally, the findings could have implications for the internal 
operation of companies.  If motivation can be increased through the 
perceived cost of judgmental error, there seems to be an argument for 
firms to employ multiple, independent decision-makers for each 
employment decision, whose decisions can be compared to each other.  
This would increase motivation for each decision-maker to examine 
their reasons and ensure that prejudice is not playing a role in order to 
avoid seeming prejudiced in comparison to their counterparts. 
The motivating factor framework, with its emphasis on whether bias 
was a reason and not the reason for an employment decision, gives an 
incentive for employers to require their employees to self-examine their 
motives before acting upon them in the employment context.  Thus, not 
only will the motivating factor framework potentially result in more 
short-term victories for plaintiffs by allowing potentially meritorious 
cases to surmount a summary judgment challenge, it will also have a 
 276. Fazio & Towles-Schwen, supra note 268, at 101. 
 277. Id. 
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more lasting effect as it could prevent decision-makers from unwittingly 
basing their decisions on unconscious bias by forcing them to examine 
their reasons ex ante.  By adopting the motivating framework, courts 
will, in the short-run, experience an increase in their employment 
discrimination litigation loads.  However, in the long-term, caseloads 
could actually decrease as employers work to curb the problem of 
subconscious bias in-house through employment policies targeted at 
self-examination by decision-makers. 
While some may be concerned that adopting the motivating factor 
framework at summary judgment would lead employers to be worried 
that they will never be able to win a motion for summary judgment 
because courts will likely find that discrimination could have played a 
role, no matter how small, in the manager’s decision.  However, the 
Supreme Court in Desert Palace specifically allowed for motivating 
factor instructions to be given at the jury phase of a trial that is based on 
either circumstantial or direct evidence of discrimination.  Thus, the 
Court envisioned that an employer in either type of case could be held 
liable even if discrimination was only partly responsible for its 
employment decision. 
Second, and more importantly, if an employer is held liable for 
employment discrimination in a mixed-motive case, the employer will 
be relieved of compensatory damages, punitive damages and backpay if 
the employer can prove that it would have made the same decision, even 
absent the discriminatory reason.278  Thus, even if a plaintiff can prove 
that discrimination played a part in the decision, the employer can avoid 
monetary damages by demonstrating that it would have made the same 
decision regardless of discrimination.  Thus, allowing the motivating 
factor analysis to be used at summary judgment does not necessarily 
mean that an employer will face certain damages.  In contrast, the 
employer will have to demonstrate its decision-making process such that 
it can show that the discriminatory reason did not play a defining role in 
the decision. 
Additionally, not every plaintiff, who has proceeded under the 
motivating factor framework in the Ninth Circuit, has been successful in 
surmounting a summary judgment motion.  For instance, in Sellie v. 
Boeing Co.,279 the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to raise 
a triable issue of fact as to whether his age resulted in his termination.280  
In that case, plaintiff, an admittedly capable employee of Boeing, was 
 278. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West 2010). 
 279. 253 F. App’x 626 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 280. Id. at 627. 
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terminated as part of a reduction in force by the company.281  He alleged 
that he was taken out of numerical order for the reduction in force and 
was terminated because of his age.282  He also offered evidence of 
discriminatory remarks about age that were made by two supervisors 
during the reduction in force.283  The Ninth Circuit held that, even if 
analyzed under the motivating factor framework, plaintiff had not 
adduced enough evidence that discrimination played a role in the actual 
decision to terminate and affirmed the district court’s award of summary 
judgment for the employer.284 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit allows the parties to choose whether to 
proceed under a single or mixed motive framework.285  Thus, plaintiffs, 
who feel that they have a particularly strong case or those who do not 
want to risk being barred from recovery of monetary damages, may still 
proceed under McDonnell Douglas and face a higher barrier at summary 
judgment.  However, because the employer will not know which 
framework an aggrieved employee may choose, it will be forced to make 
employment decisions as if it will have to confront the motivating factor 
standard on summary judgment.  As noted earlier, this will give the 
decision-maker the motivation to identify and try to counter any 
automatic stereotypes, even if ex post the employer is not subjected to a 
lower threshold at summary judgment via the motivating framework 
analysis. 
Finally, some may wonder why the framework under which a 
disparate treatment claim can be brought has to change in order to 
counteract implicit bias.  Is it not enough to increase the potential 
damages, for example?  While increasing the available damages to 
plaintiffs would increase the potential liability of employers and thus 
force employers to pay a bit more attention to their decision-making 
processes, this solution does not go far enough.  Increased damages 
within the McDonnell Douglas framework still allow an employer to 
avoid summary judgment by articulating a legitimate reason and forcing 
a plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination was the reason.  As 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 628. 
 283. Id. at 627. 
 284. Id. at 628.  The court noted that it assumed without deciding that the mixed motive 
framework applies to discrimination statutes other than Title VII.  Id.  This issue has now been decided 
by the Supreme Court.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
  In Adam v. Kempthorne, 292 F. App’x 646 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 52 
(2009), the court also affirmed the district court grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, 
finding that there was no evidence that age was a factor at all in the employer’s decision.  Id. at 649–
650.  See also Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640–41 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 285. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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discussed in Part III, supra, such a framework does not recognize the 
complexities of the decision-making process.  Furthermore, increased 
damages within the McDonnell Douglas framework would not lead to 
greater focus by the decision-maker on all of the reasons contributing to 
a decision.  Rather, the employer will simply reinforce to the decision-
maker how important it is to have a single documented reason for the 
decision.  Thus, the decision-maker will still lack the motivation to 
become aware of unconscious bias and do something to change it. 
In sum, the adoption of at least the election of proceeding under the 
motivating framework analysis at the summary judgment phase of 
employment discrimination cases will operate indirectly on employer’s 
decision-makers motivating them to scrutinize their decisions and the 
reasons for those decisions before making them.  This motivation can 
potentially counter such decision-maker’s implicit biases.  In this way, 
the law, although not able to directly root out such bias, will provide 
incentives for employers to do so, which can help mitigate the damage 
such implicit biases may have.  This will, in turn, lead to the furtherance 
of the goal of Title VII—to eliminate employment decisions made 
because of a protected characteristic. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As researchers discover more about the nature of implicit bias and the 
potential ways in which it operates to unknowingly influence 
individuals’ decision-making processes, the law of employment 
discrimination needs to help counteract this phenomenon.  Specifically, 
Title VII’s mandate to eliminate discrimination because of an 
individual’s race, sex, religion, or national origin, seems to encompass at 
least the vision of eradicating all forms of discrimination from the 
workplace—both explicit and implicit.  In order to help further this goal, 
this Article posits that the motivating factor framework should at least 
be available to a plaintiff at the summary judgment stage of all 
individual disparate treatment cases pursued under Title VII.  The 
availability of this framework will lead to an increase in the number of 
such cases that proceed to trial.  However, this should also lead to 
employers requiring managerial employees to closely scrutinize all 
reasons for their decisions before proceeding with an adverse 
employment decision.286  Such a mandate will provide such employees 
with the motivation they need to counteract their own automatic 
 286. In future work, I plan to undertake an empirical analysis of what employers in the Ninth 
Circuit are actually doing in response to the Desert Palace decision. 
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stereotypes.  Thus, the law can indirectly aid decision-makers in 
counteracting the effects of their own implicit biases. 
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